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AGENCY SELF-INSULATION UNDER 
PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW 
Jennifer Nou 
Agencies possess enormous regulatory discretion.  This discretion allows executive branch 
agencies in particular to insulate their decisions from presidential review by raising the 
costs of such review.  They can do so, for example, through variations in policymaking form, 
cost-benefit analysis quality, timing strategies, and institutional coalition-building.  This 
Article seeks to help shift the literature’s focus on court-centered agency behavior to 
consider, instead, the role of the President under current executive orders.  Specifically, it 
marshals public-choice insights to offer an analytic framework for what it calls agency self-
insulation under presidential review, illustrates the phenomenon, and assesses some 
normative implications.  The framework generates several empirically testable hypotheses 
regarding how presidential transitions and policy shifts will influence agency behavior.  It 
also challenges the doctrinal focus on removal restrictions, and highlights instead a more 
functional understanding of agency independence.  Finally, these dynamics suggest a role 
for courts to help enforce separation of powers principles within the executive branch, and 
along with Congress, to also facilitate political monitoring by encouraging information from 
sources external to the presidential review process. 
INTRODUCTION 
dministrative agencies, like trial judges facing appellate review, dis-
like having their decisions reversed.  Reversals are costly.  They can 
upend months, usually years, of work spent gathering data, reaching out to 
stakeholders, considering and responding to public comments.1  This is to 
say nothing of the efforts required to draft regulatory text, analyses, and 
preambles with the sustained coordination of policy experts, economists, 
scientists, and lawyers through multiple stages of the rulemaking process, 
from proposed to final form.2  Even then, reversals will only create more 
work if agencies are sent back to the drawing board, in settings where re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Public Law Fellow, University of Chicago Law School; former policy analyst and special assis-
tant to the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.  The views expressed are 
the author’s own and based only on public documents.  For helpful comments on earlier drafts, thanks 
to Bruce Ackerman, Ryan Bubb, Richard Epstein, William Eskridge, David Fontana, Tom Ginsburg, 
Aziz Huq, Alex Lee, Michael Levin, Jerry Mashaw, Jonathan Masur, Tom Miles, Eric Posner, Richard 
Posner, Connor Raso, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Matthew Stephenson, Jed Stiglitz, Cass Sunstein, and 
Stuart Shapiro.  Thanks also to workshop participants at the University of Chicago, Duke, George 
Washington, Harvard, New York University, Northwestern’s Law and Political Economy Colloquium, 
University of Pennsylvania, and Yale. 
 1 See Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Process  A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the 
Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations, 23 J.L. & POL. 393, 416 (2007) (reporting an average of 813 
days between agenda publication and finalization for Bush Administration rules and 844 days for Clin-
ton Administration rules during corresponding time periods). 
 2 See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 
1032, 1036–41 (2011) (describing the complicated dynamics among internal agency actors). 
A 
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sources are already constrained and budgets consistently threatened.  Re-
versals also thwart the policy preferences of the agency. 
That agencies may act strategically to avoid costly reversals, then, is 
hardly a surprise, nor is it a novel insight.  For the most part, however, 
scholars have explored this premise with respect to the anticipated effects 
of judicial review.3  From this outlook, an agency facing the prospect of 
litigation will behave so as to minimize the risk of judicial reversals.  A ra-
tional agency, that is, will select its interpretive or policy choices efficient-
ly, taking into account the court’s expected reaction and perhaps even its 
partisan composition.4  For example, many noted that after United States v. 
Mead Corp.,5 an agency could now expect to qualify for greater deference 
through more elaborate proceedings.6  Some thus expected to see agencies 
engage in more notice-and-comment rulemaking relative to less formal 
mechanisms after the decision, and have found limited empirical support 
for this claim.7  As the potential for costly judicial reversals increased, so 
did concerns about regulatory “ossification.”8 
What this perspective overlooks, however, is the fact that the vast ma-
jority of rulemaking agencies — the executive branch agencies — face not 
only the courts’ review of their decisions, but also that of the President.  
The lopsided attention in the literature to judicial review is thus puzzling 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 See, e.g., Yehonatan Givati, Strategic Statutory Interpretation by Administrative Agencies, 12 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 95 (2010); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1383, 1437–42 (2004); Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect  Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, 
and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528 (2006); Emerson H. 
Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process  Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making, 
14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 114 (1998); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments  Legal 
Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1999); Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions  The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 
53, 74–75 (1968); see also sources cited infra note 4. 
 4 These accounts generally predict that agency behavior, and litigation incentives more generally, 
will shift under “hard look” review in ways that are sensitive to reviewing judges’ nominating parties.  
See, e.g., Brandice Canes-Wrone, Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts, 47 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 205, 210 (2003); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obe-
dience to Legal Doctrine  Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175 
(1998); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 761, 813–14 (2008); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Cir-
cuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1735 (1997).  
 5 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 6 See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 3, at 532; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 (holding that 
“administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when 
it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of 
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that au-
thority,” which “may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication 
or notice-and-comment rulemaking”). 
 7 See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking  An Empirical Portrait of the 
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 932–33 (2008).   
 8 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 164–65 (1997); Thomas O. 
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419 (1992). 
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for multiple reasons.  First, presidential review is more systematic than ju-
dicial review.  Judicial review of an agency action is only available when a 
litigating party with standing and the necessary resources brings suit.9  Not 
only must that party demonstrate that she has come to court at the right 
time (that is, when the issue is ripe, based on a final agency action, and 
administratively exhausted),10 but also that review is not precluded by 
statute, nor committed to the agency’s discretion.11  Presidential review of 
rulemaking, by contrast, encompasses all “significant” regulatory actions 
submitted for review directly by the agencies themselves.12 
Even when a party does bring suit, courts are often self-consciously 
deferential to an agency’s interpretive and policy decisions.13  Presidential 
review, however, operates under weaker principles of self-restraint.  Presi-
dential review is also broader in coverage than judicial review.  More rules 
are reviewed by the executive branch relative to the courts — and the leg-
islature, for that matter.14  How many and which rules count as “signifi-
cant” enough for presidential review varies, but in recent years, the number 
has hovered between about 500 and 700 per year.15  Only a small fraction 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to 
judicial review thereof.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (holding that par-
ties failed to demonstrate circumscribed standing requirements).  Regarding litigation resources, see 
Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings  An Empirical Inves-
tigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1746–47 (2012). 
 10 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967); Myers v. 
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938); Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. CPSC, 
324 F.3d 726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 11 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). 
 12 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994). 
 13 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (“The re-
sponsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between com-
peting views of the public interest are not judicial ones . . . .”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., 
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (despite hard look, emphasizing that 
“scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute 
its judgment for that of the agency.”). 
 14 Congress, after passing a statute delegating discretion to an administrative agency can, of course, 
always override an agency rule by amending the statute.  But taking the statute as a given, Congress’s 
main opportunity to review an agency’s rule currently arises under the 1996 Congressional Review Act.  
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006).  That Act, among other things, requires agencies to send a copy of 
every new final rule and its associated analysis to Congress and the Government Accountability Office.  
Id. at § 801(a)(1)(A) & (B).  Within a sixty-day review period, Congress can use expedited procedures 
to pass a joint resolution of disapproval overturning the rule.  Id. at  § 801(a)(3)(B).  To date, however, 
the statute has been used only once in over a decade to invalidate a rule.  That rule was the Occupation-
al Safety and Health Administration’s ergonomics standard in March 2001, “an action that some believe 
to be unique to the circumstances of its passage.”  MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL 30116, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT 
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 
FOR CONGRESS 6 (2008). 
 15 See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32397, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: THE 
ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 2 (2009); U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND 
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of these, however, is litigated and reviewed in court.16  Even if one argues 
that the threat of judicial review alone is sufficient to shift agency behav-
ior, the prospect is still more attenuated relative to presidential review. 
Finally, presidential review precedes even the possibility of judicial 
oversight for many executive branch regulatory actions.  Such review will 
cover agency actions much earlier in the rulemaking process, not only pro-
posed and final rules as is commonly mischaracterized in the literature,17 
but also more preliminary notices of inquiry, requests for information, and 
advance notices of proposed rulemaking.18  Doctrines such as ripeness and 
finality, however, preclude judicial review of such actions.19  The failure to 
decompose the effects of this sequential review process — presidential, 
then judicial — may cloud existing empirical efforts to consider the im-
pacts of court oversight. 
The relative lack of attention to agency incentives when faced with 
presidential review, in short, has resulted in an ultimately incomplete ac-
count of agency behavior.  Extant work has focused on discrete but related 
issues such as the institutional role of cost-benefit analysis,20 the effects of 
political transitions more broadly,21 and agency attempts to avoid the re-
view process altogether.22  Positive political theorists have long considered 
the strategic interactions between political actors and the bureaucracy, but 
their models of political control are often more Congress-centric, frequent-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 3–4 (2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf. 
 16 For example, from 1988–90, only thirteen of the twenty-eight significant hazardous waste rules 
from the Environmental Protection Agency were challenged and reviewed in court.  See Cary 
Coglianese, Litigating within Relationships  Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process, 30 L. 
& SOC’Y REV. 735, 742 (1996).  Of the agency’s more than ninety hazardous air pollutant rules, only 
seven have been litigated to judgment, leaving eighty-three to escape judicial attention.  See Wagner, 
supra note 9, at 1740. 
 17 See, e.g., Michael Hissam, Essay, The Impact of Executive Order 13,422 on Presidential Over-
sight of Agency Administration, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1292, 1295 (2008) (describing Clinton’s exec-
utive order as requiring “cabinet departments and agencies to submit proposed and final rules to the 
OMB before publication in the Federal Register” (emphasis added)). 
 18 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994). 
 19 See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Comm’r, FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(holding that ripeness and finality doctrines precluded review of FDA advance notice of proposed rule-
making regulation because, among other things, the proposal had yet “to pass under the censorial eye of 
OMB, whose review might well have prompted revision”). 
 20 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regula-
tory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1367–70 (2002) (discussing how administrative 
process with cost-benefit information serves as “information revelation device”); Eric A. Posner, Con-
trolling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis  A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1137 (2001); see also Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence 7–9 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that agencies can use cost-benefit analysis 
methodology as means of resisting presidential review). 
 21 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
471, 477–78 (2011); O’Connell, supra note 7. 
 22 See Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994 (2011).   
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ly leaving the President to appear simply “as a strategic legislative actor, 
whose influence over the bureaucracy pales beside that of Congress.”23  
Renewed efforts to consider agencies as strategic actors in their own right 
are still nascent,24 and continue to lack a contextual examination of incen-
tives during the presidential review process as currently conceived and ac-
tually practiced.25 
This Article seeks to help further shift the focus from the judiciary to 
the executive branch by offering that analysis, illustrating its applications, 
and assessing the normative implications.  Specifically, it draws upon pub-
lic choice premises grounded in the straightforward notion that agencies 
can choose from different regulatory instruments, each of which will im-
pose varying costs on the executive branch to review and reverse.  Increas-
ing reviewing costs will effectively insulate various decisions contained 
within a rule, or across a number of rules, since the President will have to 
spend his limited resources more selectively, reviewing and reversing few-
er decisions.  These agency self-insulation instruments are both the means 
through which agencies can bypass review as well as raise the political and 
resource costs during the review itself.  The incentive to engage in strate-
gic behavior, in turn, increases the more an agency expects the President to 
disagree with and thus reverse it.26  At the same time, decreases in relative 
resources can also have self-insulating effects as well.  Because agencies 
are repeat players, with self-insulation earning the President’s ire, the strat-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice  Critique and Rapprochement, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 19, 38 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell eds., 2010); see also Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in PER-
SPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 455, 473 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (observing that “positive theo-
rists have emphasized the courts’ role as backstoppers of Congress . . . .  Presidents, who spell trouble 
for Congress, have been explored less seriously . . . [as] their control is either downplayed or viewed as 
unwarranted.”).   
 24 See, e.g., GREGORY A. HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY 14 (2007); Note, 
supra note 22; O’Connell, supra note 7, at 916–22, O’Connell, supra note 21, at 482–87; Alex Acs & 
Charles Cameron, Regulatory Auditing at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (Sept. 13, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  Acs and Cameron model the relationship be-
tween OIRA and agencies as an auditing game, where the agency’s choice is between inaction, a 
“small,” and an “economically significant” regulation.  Id. at 9.  Instead of the incentive effects on the 
agency (this Article’s focus), however, their main task is to analyze OIRA’s actual targeting decisions.  
For an older work in this Article’s tradition, see WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 24–30 (1971), which posits agency behavior in terms of budget-
maximization.  But see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 915, 932–34 (questioning Niskanen’s model of bureaucratic behavior).  
 25 See Robert F. Durant & William G. Resh, Presidential Agendas, Administrative Strategies, and 
the Bureaucracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 577, 582 (George C. 
Edwards III & William G. Howell eds., 2009) (after surveying relevant political science literature, not-
ing that “there is still a great deal we do not know and that merits future research,” including the 
“need” for “contextual analyses to improve our understanding of how agencies react strategically to 
White House centralization efforts”).   
 26 The incentive likely persists even when the agency is simply uncertain about those preferences 
but wants to avoid the potential review costs.   
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egy will be selectively deployed — only when most valuable to the agen-
cy.  
The full story is, of course, a more subtle one.  There are many poten-
tial benefits to presidential review that may reduce the incentive to self-
insulate, as well as informal communication avenues preceding formal re-
view that render the prospect infeasible.  Self-insulation may thus be the 
most prevalent for the broad set of regulatory actions that are not clearly 
salient or high-profile, which are likely to come to the attention of the 
White House through other means.27  And no doubt, other exogenous ac-
tors and oversight mechanisms — most notably from Congress — can cut 
against and complicate these dynamics, some of which will be briefly dis-
cussed.  The narrow focus here, however, will be on the relationship be-
tween executive branch agencies and the President under formal regulatory 
review, holding all other factors constant; in this sense, the Article presents 
a partial equilibrium analysis.  One aim is to isolate a robust set of dynam-
ics that can generate compelling (but falsifiable) hypotheses, with a view 
toward helping to explain potentially systematic behavioral variation. 
Exploring these intraexecutive branch dynamics is valuable in part be-
cause they temper two traditional tenets of presidential control.  First, the 
most robust accounts of a “unitary” executive celebrate a vision of execu-
tive power that can be traced to “one, and only one, person,” emphasizing 
the accountability-enhancing features of that singular figurehead.28  The 
scope of this vision must be qualified, however, by the reality that Presi-
dents delegate regulatory review to a number of agents, mostly within the 
Executive Office of the President, who themselves disagree and conflict 
over what the President desires.  Accountability diminishes when these ac-
tors publicly blame each other for unpopular policies from which the Pres-
ident seeks distance.29  In other words, the more the institutional presiden-
cy is perceived as a “they” and not an “it,” the more diffuse the blame.30  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 See infra Part 0; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs  
Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2013) (manuscript at 11–12, 35), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192639 (discussing informal channels through 
which OIRA and the White House can be alerted to upcoming rules).  The most high-profile rules are 
more likely to come to the attention of the White House through informal means and external fire-alarm 
oversight, and may thus also gain the most benefits from review in terms of information, expertise, and 
political support.   
 28 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 3 (2008); see 
also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 2–3 (1994).   
 29 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, White House and the F.D.A. Often at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2012, 
at A1 (describing various policy conflicts involving, among others, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the FDA 
Commissioner, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the OIRA Administrator). 
 30 See JOHN P. BURKE: THE INSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY 27–52 (2d. ed. 2000) (discussing insti-
tutional features of presidency); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Adminis-
trative State  A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) 
(“Presidential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”); Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 3) (“[W]hile the 
President is ultimately in charge, the White House itself is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”). 
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As such, while this Article speaks of review by the “President” and “presi-
dential review,” the terms are but shorthand for the more complex dynam-
ics of the coordinated, interagency review process within the executive 
branch; it refers not to review by the President as an individual, but rather 
to that of the institution. 
Second, also at stake in these debates is the ability of the President to 
sanction defiant agency heads.  A look through the U.S. case reporters 
would suggest that, at least as a doctrinal matter, the hallmark of such con-
trol lies in the President’s removal power.  Recently, in Free Enterprise 
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, for example, the 5–
4 majority struck down a “dual for-cause” provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act: Congress could not create an entity, the heads of which enjoyed for-
cause tenure protections, within another agency, the heads of which were 
similarly protected.31  The second layer of removal restrictions unconstitu-
tionally blurred the lines of executive responsibility.   
By contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent privileged function over form.32  
In his view, the independence of an agency depended on a number of fac-
tors, including its separate budgeting and litigating authority and, “above 
all, a political environment, reflecting tradition and function, that would 
impose a heavy political cost” upon a President seeking to remove without 
cause.33  Independence, that is, was a matter of degree that could not be 
determined by removal restrictions alone, but rather required a careful as-
sessment of the likely presidential calculations within particular contexts. 
One way to understand the majority and dissent’s disagreement is as an 
empirical one about the actual determinants of successful agency resistance 
to the President: do removal restrictions trump the myriad other factors 
that could determine relative bargaining power?34  If not, then courts need 
other tools and more systematic ways to think about the concept.  By fo-
cusing on a subset of agencies without the traditional hallmarks of inde-
pendence, the executive branch agencies, this analysis provides one such 
lens, trained on the ways in which agencies can resist institutionalized 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (2010). 
 32 See id. at 3169, 3183 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 33 Id. at 3183. 
 34 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies  Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010) (listing a number of potential “equalizing factors”); Kirti Datla & Rich-
ard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies), CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 5–6), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125194 (surveying independent and executive 
agencies for a “broad set of indicia of independence,” and finding no single common feature); Kevin M. 
Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 295 (2006) 
(arguing that “who is granted express authority under the statute likely influences the relative bargain-
ing positions of the agency and the President”); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independ-
ence, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1–2), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103338 (arguing that agency independence can be 
explained by reference to conventions). 
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forms of presidential influence amidst resource constraints.  In addition, it 
also highlights another locus of independence in the more stable federal 
bureaucracy, the career civil servants within agencies who may bear many 
of the potential reversal costs and thus possess significant incentives to 
avoid them.  As such, the discussion hopes to join insights from studies 
that attempt to understand how agency officials “assess presidential con-
trol” and “how it affect[s] their decision-making processes,”35 along with 
more top-down analyses of White House control36 and more recent efforts 
to clarify the nature of the presidential review process.37  This investiga-
tion also seeks to engage the literature on cost-benefit analysis not only as 
a set of numbers such as net benefits, but also as a practice — the ways 
that agencies, for example, present costs and benefits, and why.38 
Moreover, this Article will argue that agency self-insulation can serve 
as signals of agency resistance, the normative desirability of which de-
pends on the nature of the underlying statutory scheme at issue.  Under 
statutes that narrowly constrain policy discretion, self-insulation should be 
viewed as more likely to be salutary, as attempts to protect against undue 
politicization; thus, in these circumstances, courts should be more willing 
to uphold such efforts under either Chevron’s second step or hard look re-
view.  By contrast, when statutes authorize broad policy judgments and 
call for discretionary interest-balancing, then courts should view self-
insulation as more likely to be unwarranted, now understood as efforts to 
avoid democratic accountability.  Finally, both courts and Congress should 
facilitate political monitoring when strategic behavior or resource con-
straints have reduced the quality of information about a regulatory action’s 
consequences. 
Part I introduces an analytic framework focusing on the potential for 
principal-agent divergence between agencies and the President as well as 
the resulting decision and reviewing costs.  Part II further develops this 
approach by examining the various regulatory instruments available to a 
self-insulating agency and the incentives to choose among them.  Specifi-
cally, these instruments can functionally serve to bypass review, calibrate 
its scrutiny, or truncate the amount of time available — all of which can be 
augmented by successful coalition-building attempts.  Part III, in turn, ex-
amines various responses available to the executive branch, such as direc-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 62. 
 36 See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking  An Empirical Investigation, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 873–76 (2003); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245, 2284–90 (2001).  
 37 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 27. 
 38 See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Introduction, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837 
(2000). 
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tives, spot-checks, and timing strategies, as well as the potential implica-
tions for Congress and the courts. 
I.  FACING PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW 
A.  Strategic Agencies 
One of administrative law’s anxieties is the problem of authority dele-
gated from more politically accountable actors to the unelected ones within 
administrative agencies.  Concerns that Congress has effectively abdicated 
the monitoring of its initial delegation of power, resigned only to “fire 
alarm” oversight by interest groups and stymied by collective action prob-
lems, only heighten these worries.39  If congressional ex post oversight is 
sporadic and ad hoc, some have argued that political actors could neverthe-
less control bureaucratic discretion by carefully designing the ex ante 
structures and processes through which agencies determine policy out-
comes.40  One basic premise of these accounts was that procedures could 
help promote these outcomes by, for example, stacking the deck towards 
preferred interest groups,41 specifying the timing of agency decisions,42 or 
otherwise constraining agency discretion. 
1.  The Limits of Ex Ante Controls. — With much of the attention on the 
relationship between Congress and agencies, however, Presidents were, 
“for all intents and purposes, left out”43 of many scholarly analyses, pri-
marily characterized as part of the enacting coalition,44 or else notable only 
for their indirect influence on legislative calculations, perhaps through later 
appointments45 or veto threats.46  In response, some sought to bring the 
President firmly back into the picture as a discrete and autonomous actor 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked  Police Pa-
trols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
 40 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics 
and Policy  Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 
433–34 (1989). 
 41 See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency 
Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699 (1994); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 
261 (1987); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Adminis-
trative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 99–101 (1992). 
 42 See generally Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 543 (2007). 
 43 DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 14 (2003). 
 44 See, e.g., MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 9 
(1995). 
 45 Id. at 9–10.  See also Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 41, at 698.  
 46 See John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON & 
ORG. 1, 12–17 (1990). 
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with his own institutional objectives and mechanisms of control.47  In this 
view, sitting atop the institutions that execute and project his power, the 
President must delegate tasks to his own agents and assure their fidelity.  
These include efforts to “politicize” the bureaucracy through appointments, 
along with the related need to remove insubordinates.48 
A growing literature, however, has documented some of the pragmatic 
realities that blunt the impact of both of these strategies.  Appointments 
can often arise from patronage motivations as opposed to close ideological 
alignment,49 or can prove less effective due to the relative institutional in-
experience of the appointees50 or countervailing legislative pressures.51  
Similarly, while the power of the President to remove an agency head at 
will no doubt bears on the scope of his influence, some have questioned its 
actual utility and detailed the obstacles to its use.52  Namely, removals can 
exact high political costs, especially when they defy norms or conventions 
about the removed party’s perceived need for independence.53  In light of 
these limitations, the social science literature has taken a more functional 
approach to presidential control, as “the degree of actual or effective con-
trol exerted over the agency.”54  These accounts have identified other ave-
nues of presidential influence, such as through budgetary decisions coordi-
nated by the Office of Management and Budget,55 input in agency 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13–15 (1994). 
 48 Political scientists have observed that the percentage of presidential appointees as a share of the 
federal workforce has more than doubled since mid-century, peaking in 1980 and increasing during uni-
fied governments.  See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 98 
fig.4 2, 202–05 (2008); David E. Lewis, Presidential Appointments and Personnel, 14 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 47, 49–50 (2011).  Evidence also suggests that efforts to politicize appointments increase when 
policy disagreement between the President and agencies is expected to be largest, for example when 
comparing efforts after a party change in the next President against situations without such changes.  
LEWIS, supra, at 89.   
 49 See Joshua D. Clinton et al., Separated Powers in the United States  The Ideology of Agencies, 
Presidents, and Congress, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341, 346, 352 (2012).   
 50 See LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, supra note 48, at 174–89.   
 51 See Nolan McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 413, 413–14 (2004). 
  52 See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 461, 480–82 (2010); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive from Those Who Would Dis-
tort and Abuse It  A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 607 (2010) (describing numerous examples of when “legal obstacles to the 
use of the President’s removal power [we]re insignificant in their effects,” while the “political obstacles 
[we]re often formidable”).   
 53 See Pierce, supra note 52, at 607; Vermeule, supra note 34. 
 54 Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW 333, 347 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). 
 55 See SHELLEY LYNNE TOMKIN, INSIDE OMB 117–216 (1998); Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. 
Burden & William G. Howell, The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 783, 792–94 (2010) (finding evidence that districts and counties receive more federal outlays 
when representives are in the President’s party).  
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legislative programs,56 or the relative location of the agency within the 
cabinet hierarchy.57 
While these structures and processes are important ex ante mechanisms 
of control, they still allow for significant agency slack and discretion over 
individual rules and regulatory decisions.  As a result, numerous Presidents 
have opted for more institutionalized and systematic mechanisms of ex 
post oversight through regulatory review.58  These agency-cost-reducing 
procedures are categorically different from ex ante control mechanisms in 
that they allow the President to evaluate and more surgically influence dis-
crete administrative outputs rather than inputs.  While appointments and 
budgeting, for instance, can help steer the general direction of regulatory 
policy, review procedures by their very nature allow the President to reas-
sess the individual outcomes of these efforts after the fact and to react un-
der potentially changed circumstances.59  They allow, that is, for more dy-
namic and responsive presidential influence.60 
In this manner, presidential review can, like appellate court review, be 
understood as part of a class of institutional mechanisms that involve more 
flexible and situation-specific monitoring by principals distinct from the 
enforcement of more rigid ex ante rules.61  As regulatory review becomes 
increasingly institutionalized through promulgated procedures and stand-
ards, it also becomes more predictable relative to more ad hoc methods of 
ex post monitoring.  The process is thus more likely to give rise to sus-
tained patterns of strategic behavior on the part of covered actors the long-
er these procedures are in place. 
2.  Presidential Review. — The current structure of presidential review 
has, for the most part, persisted for almost twenty years, since 1993 when 
President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866.62  While these governing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 See ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, MANAGING THE PRESIDENT’S PROGRAM 5–8 (2002). 
 57 LEWIS, supra note 43, at 44–45. 
 58 See Alan E. Wiseman, Delegation and Positive-Sum Bureaucracies, 71 J. POL. 998, 999–1000 
(2009). 
 59 See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 97 (2008) (noting that “where-
as the president lacks the ability to veto selective pieces of legislation, he enjoys a ‘line-item veto,’ so 
to speak, of agencies’ regulatory initiatives”).  Of course, over time, one could also understand person-
nel and funding efforts as ways of disciplining an agency based on a broad review of its policies or par-
ticularly salient ones, but these mechanisms are too blunt and static for this purpose, and thus better 
understood as prospective, rather than retrospective, tools.  See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & David 
Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 126, 127 (1992) 
(“The appointment of the agency director and senior staff guides the future direction of the agency.”).   
 60 See William F. West, The Institutionalization of Regulatory Review  Organizational Stability and 
Responsive Competence at OIRA, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 76, 78 (2005). 
 61 See Jeffrey S. Banks, Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 670 
(1989); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1422, 1454 (2011) (categorizing both appellate review and executive review of rulemaking as examples 
of “settings [where] the principal can only establish forms of review in which the overseer makes what-
ever decision is optimal ex post, rather than enforcing a set of rules that would be optimal ex ante”). 
 62 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993). 
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procedures are the focus of this Article, some brief historical context will 
be useful.  Presidential oversight efforts date back centuries,63 though Pres-
ident Reagan was arguably the first to exert more supervisory control 
“self-consciously and openly”64 when he issued Executive Order 12,291 in 
1981.65  Among other things, the order required executive agencies to 
submit proposed and final rules to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB),66 a role delegated thereafter to the then newly-established Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).67  For a subset of these 
rules, those deemed “major,”68 agencies also had to submit a “regulatory 
impact analysis”: the agency’s description of the rule’s anticipated costs 
and benefits, net benefits, and the potential alternatives considered.69 
These innovations were reinforced four years later when President 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,498, which now allowed OMB to exert 
its influence earlier in the regulatory process in conjunction with agencies’ 
political appointees.70  The order required executive agencies to submit a 
“regulatory program” for review each year that covered all of their signifi-
cant regulatory actions underway or planned.71  The President now had an 
opportunity to influence the regulatory process during its planning, pro-
posal, and final stages. 
While George H.W. Bush’s Administration continued under the Reagan 
executive orders, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 in 1993, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law  Federalist Foundations, 
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1304–06 (2006) (describing various examples, for instance, that 
“[President] Washington imposed his will through a consistent style of broad consultation, independent 
judgment, and continuous oversight”); Kagan, supra note 36, at 2272–77; see also Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s 
Formative Years  The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 
63 ADMIN L. REV. 37, 39 (2011) (arguing that “centralized review was developed and implemented by 
OMB” during “fifteen years preceding OIRA”). 
 64 Kagan, supra note 36, at 2277. 
 65 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). 
 66 See id. § 3(c). 
 67 See id. § (6)(b). Created under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, OIRA is located within the 
Executive Office of the President (EOP), and specifically, the Office of Management and Budget.  See 
Pub. L. No 96-511, § 3503, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended in 44 U.S.C. ch. 35 (2006)); see U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF 
AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 17–18 (2003) [hereinafter 
GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY].   
 68 Specifically, section 1(b) of the order defined a major rule as “any regulation that is likely to re-
sult in: (1) [a]n annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; (2) [a] major increase in costs or 
prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic 
regions; or (3) [s]ignificant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, in-
novation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises 
in domestic or export markets.”  Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 127, 127–28 (1981). 
 69 Id. § 3(c)–(d). 
 70 See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985); James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review By the 
Executive Office of the President  An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L. J. 
851, 867 (2001). 
 71 Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601(1988), revoked by 
Exec. Order No. 12,866.   
  
14   
which contained several noteworthy changes relevant here.72  First, unlike 
the previous regime that reviewed all regulations, executive branch agen-
cies now only had to submit those rules that were the most “significant,” 
demarcating a reduced scope of review.73  The effort was an attempt to 
make the process more selective “so as to focus resources on the most im-
portant.”74 
Second, those rules that were “economically significant” were required 
to provide an especially thorough regulatory impact analysis.75  Such rules 
effectively heightened the scrutiny of review as well as the amount of in-
formation available for it.  Third, since agencies and other commentators 
had accused OIRA of unduly delaying regulations, the order now estab-
lished a presumptive timetable: it expected review to be complete within 
90 days, but allowed the OMB Director to extend that period for another 
30 days at the request of the agency.76  Fourth, the order also contained a 
number of dispute resolution provisions for “disagreements or conflicts be-
tween or among agency heads or between OMB and any agency that 
[could not] be resolved by the [OIRA Administrator] . . . .”77  Specifically, 
such disputes were to be resolved by the President or the Vice President 
acting at the President’s request.78 
Finally, the order specified general standards of review.  Namely, it 
called for consistency with the “President’s priorities,” the prevention of 
“conflict” with “policies or actions taken or planned by another agency,” 
as well as adherence to the “principles set forth in this Executive Order.”79  
One of the most important principles was that the “benefits of the intended 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 72 Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993). 
 73 Id. § (6)(a)(3)(A).  Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(b), with minor exceptions, covers all agencies 
except those “considered to be independent regulatory agencies” as defined by a provision of the Pa-
perwork Reduction Act.  44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (1988).  See Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the 
Economic Analysis of Regulations at Independent Regulation Commissions, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 
214–15 (2011). Cf. Exec. Order 12,866 § 4(b)-(c) (requiring independent regulatory agencies to submit 
Regulatory Agenda and Plan).   
 74 Kagan, supra note 36, at 2287; see also Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty  Reflections and Recom-
mendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 105 (2011) (noting process was “more selective”). 
 75 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645–46 (1993).  Circular A-4, in turn, 
states that “Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct a regulatory analysis for economically 
significant regulatory actions as defined by Section 3(f)(1).”  See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. 
Office of the President, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (2003) (hereinafter Circular A-4), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4; Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 13) (de-
scribing “Regulatory Impact Analysis’ as “a careful and detailed account of the costs and benefits of 
economically significant rules”). 
 76 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(2)(B)–(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647 (1993).  Review of “notices of in-
quiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, or other preliminary regulatory actions prior to a Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking” were to be completed within 10 working days of submission.  Id. 
§ 6(b)(2)(A).  
 77 Id. § 7. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. § 2(b). 
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regulation justify its costs,”80 while another demanded the “best reasonably 
obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information” regard-
ing regulatory consequences.81  In this manner, the order distinguished be-
tween what might be called political review, those issues raised as part of 
the president’s agenda and priorities, and analytical review: how agencies 
evaluate the costs and benefits of regulatory options, justify the choices 
among them, and consider a host of other technical issues.82 
As an indication of just how entrenched these procedures had become, 
President George W. Bush left Clinton’s executive order virtually unmodi-
fied for most of his Administration.  In 2002, however, he issued an order 
that transferred various vice presidential functions to the White House 
chief of staff or OMB Director, but otherwise left the previous text un-
changed.83  It was not until January 2007, about thirteen years since Presi-
dent Clinton’s intervention, that President Bush imposed more substantive 
amendments.84  On January 30, 2009, however, President Obama withdrew 
the Bush amendments and returned to the original and unamended Clinton 
executive order.85  In January 2011, he issued Executive Order 13,563, 
which, among other things, “reaffirm[ed] the principles, structures, and 
definitions governing contemporary regulatory review” and modernized 
many of its provisions.86  As such, with the exception of about two years 
under President George W. Bush, the formal procedures first established 
under President Clinton in 1993 continue to operate today.87 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 Id. § 1(b)(6).  That determination could consider both “quantifiable” as well as “qualitative” costs 
and benefits, factors that were “difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider.” Id. § 1(a). 
 81 Id. § 1(b)(7). 
 82 See Stuart Shapiro, Unequal Partners  Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive Review of Regula-
tions, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,433, 10,433–34 (2005) (distinguishing between “OIRA’s role as the eyes 
and ears of the president in overseeing regulatory agencies” and its “analytical mission”).  On the one 
hand, “the review process will ask how and if the rule fits with the law and with presidential commit-
ments, goals, and priorities.”  Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 30); on the other hand, it will also 
concern more “technical” issues such as the “accuracy” of costs and benefits, the “avoidance of unjusti-
fied costs,” as well as (1) alternatives; (2) the need to seek public comments; (3) logical outgrowth is-
sues; (4) the need for interim final rules; (5) statutory process requirements; and (6) scientific issues.  
Id. at 30–31. 
 83 Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2002). 
 84 Among the most important, the amendments now required agencies to identify “market fail-
ure[s]” in writing, specified that Regulatory Policy Officers within agencies had to be political appoin-
tees who served as gatekeepers for new rulemakings and, finally, explicitly extended regulatory review 
to guidance documents.  Exec. Order No. 13,422, §§ 1(a), 5(b), 7, 3 C.F.R. 191, 191–93 (2007).  For an 
argument that the “ultimate impact of the Bush amendments” was “largely symbolic,” see Cary 
Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 85 (2008).  
 85 See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009). 
 86 See Exec. Order No. 13,563 §§ 1(b), 2–6, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215–17 (2011).  See also Exec. Order 
No. 13,579, §§ 1(b)–(c), 3 C.F.R. 256, 257 (2011) (providing that independent agencies “should” simi-
larly “promote” and “comply” with many of the general principles). 
 87 See generally Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 16–28 (1995) (describing the procedural innovations introduced by President Clinton). 
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B.  Resource-Centered Insulation 
Given the prospect of presidential review as practiced in its current 
form for almost two decades, it is reasonable to expect that executive 
branch agencies, and especially the career staff within them, have learned 
to manage and adapt to the process in accordance with their own aims.  
Administrative agencies are bureaucracies as traditionally conceived, and 
such bureaucracies have long been known to create routines and strategies 
for new requirements imposed upon them.88  As such, it is fruitful to think 
about agency behavior relative to the President’s in terms of their respec-
tive resource constraints, and the differential costs and payoffs for the op-
tions available to actors (like agencies) that initiate review and the actors 
(like the institutional President) that review them.  These concepts, origi-
nally developed by Emerson Tiller and Pablo Spiller for the purposes of 
understanding agency interaction with judicial review,89 yield fresh per-
spectives when applied to the presidential context. 
1.  Strategic Self-Insulation. — The basic insight pursued in depth here 
is that resource-constrained agencies can choose among various regulatory 
forms and strategies to achieve their desired results, while at the same time 
making it more difficult for the institutional President to review and re-
verse them.  Specifically, they can make such review more difficult by in-
creasing the costs of review, thereby forcing the President to spend his lim-
ited resources more selectively such that he reverses fewer decisions and 
affirms the rest.  In this manner, agency instruments that increase review-
ing costs effectively serve to insulate discrete decisions within a rule, or 
across rules.   
Holding other factors constant, agencies will be more likely to self-
insulate the greater their perceived preference divergence from the Presi-
dent.  In other words, one would expect to observe self-insulation more 
when the agency expects the President to be an enemy (to have different 
preferences), rather than an ally (with the same preferences); the agency 
seeks to shield decisions more from the former relative to the latter.90  
Moreover, because agencies are repeat players that would undoubtedly 
earn the executive branch’s displeasure after recurrent and brazen attempts 
to self-insulate, they are most likely to do so when it would be the most 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 88 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 221–32 (1989) (discussing how bureaucracies adapt to 
innovations); see generally CORNELL G. HOOTON, EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE: PRESIDENTIAL AD-
MINISTRATIONS AND POLICY CHANGE IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 5 (1997) (examining the 
“patterns of attention and concern among career officials and on the organizational factors that shape 
the ability of departmental bureaus to adopt new activities”). 
 89 See Emerson H. Tiller, Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory  Cost-
Benefit Analysis and the Like, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1461–62 (2002); Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, 
at 352–62.   
 90 See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (using terminology). 
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valuable to them — when the probability of reversal is greatest but not 
certain, when decision costs and resource investment are relatively high, or 
more generally, when agencies receive the most benefit from doing so. 
To help motivate this account, begin by considering a familiar analogy: 
that of trial judges who seek to avoid reversal upon appellate review.  Re-
versals can impose real resource costs on trial judges in the form of new 
trials or motions on remand, and they can impose reputational costs as 
well.91  Trial judges thus have strong incentives to insulate their decisions 
and minimize the probability of reversal.  A trial judge might do so, for 
example, by writing an opinion that turns more heavily on a finding of fact 
rather a question of law in order to take advantage of a more favorable 
standard upon appellate review (say, “clearly erroneous” instead of “de no-
vo”).92  To reverse this decision, the appellate judge would thus have to 
use more resources to examine the record and describe her rationale in 
greater detail, given the more deferential standard.  As a result, a resource-
constrained appellate judge would have less incentive to reverse this fact-
bound decision.  In this manner, the trial judge would have insulated her 
decision. 
So too can administrative agencies self-insulate under presidential re-
view.  Of course, the analogy is imperfect; for starters, judges have life 
tenure, a lack of mission-orientation, and so on.  The nature of judicial re-
versal is also less iterative and dynamic than in the presidential context, as 
we shall see.93  But the analogy not coincidental either: the “basic modali-
ties of [presidential] review” since Reagan’s executive order have been 
“drawn, perhaps unconsciously, from appellate court review of agency 
rules.”94  Those modalities themselves, in turn, “borrowed from the under-
standings that govern the relationship between appeals courts and trial 
courts in civil litigation.”95  In other words, presidential review was de-
signed with the appellate court review model in mind.96  As in that model, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 91 See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want? An 
Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 518, 518–19 (2011); Evan H. 
Caminker, Precedent and Prediction  The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 
73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77–78 (1994); David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketol-
ogy, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 702–03 (2007). 
 92 See HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
19, 23 (2007); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Fact Discretion, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 
(2008).  Cf. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines  Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 24–25 (2006) (hypothe-
sizing that sentencing judges pursue policy preferences, in part, by making fact-oriented determinations 
that garner a deferential standard of review). 
 93 See infra Part 0.ii. 
 94 See E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB  Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 
12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
167, 170 (1994).    
 95 See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review 
Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 940 (2011). 
 96 See Elliott, supra note 94, at 170.   
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review occurs as a matter of ex post oversight after many of the major 
substantive and procedural decisions, whether during trials or agency rule-
drafting. have already been made.  In this sense, both appellate court and 
presidential review represent opportunities for strategic behavior, “where 
the ability to manipulate the instruments of decision making, rather than 
merely selecting policy choices, allows actors to insulate their policy 
choices from higher level review.”97 
To explore these implications in greater depth, the remaining analysis 
will largely treat agencies and the President as unitary actors with exoge-
nous preferences, though it will later relax some of these assumptions.  
These simplifications allow for greater initial, analytic traction and are also 
reasonable as a first approximation: agencies move first when they submit 
a regulatory action for review in anticipation of what they know (or think 
they know) about the President’s preferences before the review process be-
gins.98  Even when those predictions may be wrong, the uncertainties 
about what the agency may discover during a costly review can be incen-
tive enough to engage in self-insulation.  As others have noted, the process 
was mainly “designed as an end-of-the-pipeline check against poorly con-
ceived regulations,”99 thus “operating as a kind of last-minute barrier to 
action at a point when cooperation and trust are nearly impossible.”100  In 
other words, while endogenous preference-shifting by both the agency and 
the President is possible and undoubtedly occurs,101 the structure and con-
straints of the review process can often make the prospect more difficult. 
Of course, in reality, the “agency” and the “President” are not singular 
entities; rather, they are institutions.  Institutions have multiple actors with-
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 97 Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 349. 
 98 See Huber, supra note 24, at 24 (discussing “notions of bureaucratic anticipation” whereby bu-
reaucrats can “alter the status quo policy over which external political bargaining takes place” by “mov-
ing first”). 
 99 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Making Sense of Regulation: 2001 
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, 
and Tribal Entities 43, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport.pdf. 
 100 Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 16.  In Bressman and Vandenbergh’s interviews: 
    Some EPA respondents commented that OIRA review occurs too late in the rule-making pro-
cess.  OIRA “is a reactive organization.  It receives rules over the transom that agencies have already 
prepared.  [OIRA has] ninety days to review [the rules and] on the eighty-ninth day, they say ‘we don’t 
like it, do over.’  Early interaction would be helpful so that we don’t waste each other’s time.”   
  Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 95–96 (alterations in original). 
 101 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 10) (recalling “countless instances in which the pro-
cess of interagency comment during OIRA review, or the agency’s own continuing consideration of the 
underlying issues, leads the agency to make changes quickly and with enthusiasm”); id. at 18 (stating 
that “[i]t is possible . . . that technical experts at the rulemaking agency will decide to revise their anal-
ysis and even their conclusions in light of insights provided by other technical experts”).  His account 
emphasizes the ways in which an agency’s views can and do shift during the review process in response 
to the “dispersed information inside and outside the federal government” aggregated during review.  Id. 
at 35.  Future work should accordingly extend this framework to incorporate more fully the endogenous 
preferences of the agency and the President. 
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in them, each playing various roles.  First, consider the “agency” (we will 
consider the “President” in more depth too, but much later).  Agencies 
have career staff with tenure protections and no expressed political loyal-
ties,102 as well as agency heads appointed by the President, subject to typi-
cally deferential Senate approval, and removable at will.103  But if the 
President appoints executive branch agency heads and can fire them with-
out cause, why would one ever expect agency and presidential preferences 
to diverge?  The short answer is that the President and his agency heads 
suffer from familiar principal-agent problems, which can be exacerbated 
by similar issues between agency heads and their career staff.104  Indeed, 
while this story is in part about the potential conflict between the President 
and his appointees, it is perhaps even more so about the incentives of the 
quasi-independent federal bureaucracy relative to its multiple overseers.  
First, even the most faithful civil servants and loyal agency heads may 
have divergent preferences due to knowledge about what they perceive 
(rightly or wrongly) as more refined information about implementation dif-
ficulties or political sensitivities.105  Because of the transaction costs of 
briefing and elevating issues, such information may be difficult to fully 
convey to superiors.  This agency head or civil servant may thus resist en-
treaties due to constraints “of which the Executive [or the appointee] is on-
ly dimly aware.”106  Moreover, many decisions are necessarily made at the 
career staff level and never elevated, despite what could be the contrary 
wishes of agency heads or the President, had they been informed of the is-
sues.  This prospect need not be a pernicious one, but can also be a func-
tion of limited resources and the need to prioritize among issues worthy of 
higher-level attention.  Alternatively, such divergence may also arise be-
cause of the President’s own transaction costs in communicating his priori-
ties and having them filter down multiple levels in ways that facilitate ful-
ly informed elevation of an issue.   
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 102 See Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem 
of Bureaucracy 7 (1994) (“[Career employees] have strict tenure guarantees, have no expressed ties to 
the administration or to Congress, and by law are to be politically neutral.”).   
 103 Of course, this is itself a simplification.  As Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap explain:  
  Distinctions must be made among political appointees, who hold the top positions in most agen-
cies; senior career officials, who hold positions in the Senior Executive Service (SES) or have top man-
agement General Schedule positions . . . within the civil service; and the rank-and-file career work-
force . . . .  These three groups have very different incentives for policy administration and operate 
under different constraints within the bureaucracy. 
  See id. at 7.  For another more nuanced discussion of internal agency dynamics, see Magill & 
Vermeule, supra note 2. 
 104 Much empirical evidence supports the notion that the preferences of career civil servants within 
an agency diverge from those of political appointees.  See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 49, at 345–46. 
 105 See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106  
Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1302–03 (2006). 
 106 Id. at 1303. 
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Moreover, there is the well-known prospect of bureaucratic capture — 
the notion that agency actors, both career and political, may become be-
holden to external special interests, whether the regulated industry or 
broader public interest groups.107  The notorious “revolving door” between 
agencies and industry only reinforces this concern.108   Alternatively, ca-
reer staff may have been hired or may have self-selected due to the agen-
cy’s single-mission orientation, bringing to the job a narrowly focused 
zeal.109  They may in turn influence political appointees who may end up 
“go[ing] native” and supporting the views of their entrenched staff.110  Fi-
nally, the difficulties of the confirmation process, especially under divided 
government, may also result in appointees whose preferences are not fully 
aligned with the President due to the compromises struck with Con-
gress.111   
In a similar vein, a host of dynamic, exogenous factors — including 
pressure from congressional committees and interest groups — will also 
increase the prospect of disagreement for individual rules.  For any of 
these reasons, there is the potential for preference divergence between the 
President and even his most loyal appointed agency heads or faithful ca-
reer staff.  Putting the cover back on the agency again, this analysis will 
assume that agencies as a unit behave accordingly; opportunities for pref-
erence divergence abound. 
At the same time, Presidents and agencies — like trial judges and ap-
pellate courts — make decisions with limited resources.  Thus, understand-
ing the costs each incurs by initiating and reviewing an action are critical 
to appreciating their respective incentives.  Call these decision costs for the 
agency and reviewing costs for the President.112  Both kinds of costs in-
clude the resources necessary to acquire, synthesize, and deliberate over 
the information necessary to reach a rational conclusion, as well as the 
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 107 See generally, e.g., Paul J. Quirk, Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies (1981).  
According to this argument, regulated industries have the resources, incentives, and information neces-
sary to influence agency career staff or political appointees.  Similarly, public interest groups are also 
influential given their ability to marshal publicity and political pressure.  See Michael E. Levine & Jen-
nifer L.  Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda  Toward a Synthesis, 6 
J.L. Econ. & Org. 167, 169 (1990); Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air 
(1981) (discussing role of industry and public interest groups).    
 108 Quirk, supra note 107, at 143–74.   
 109 See David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making  Rethinking the Positive 
Theory of Political Control, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 407, 424 (1997) (“[A]n agency with a well-defined mis-
sion will tend to attract bureaucrats whose goals are sympathetic to that mission.”); Bagley & Revesz, 
supra note 105, at 1300–02.  
 110 Elliott, supra note 94, at 176.  These views may be particularly informed by some career staff 
that have spent decades or even their entire careers at the agency, perhaps becoming heavily invested in 
the release of internally resource-intensive regulatory actions.  See Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. 
Furlong, Rulemaking 129–164 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing complex and resource-intensive processes for 
managing the internal agency development of rules). 
 111 See generally McCarty, supra note 51. 
 112 The term “decision cost” is used by Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 351.   
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costs of communicating that conclusion.  Say, for example, that the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required by statute to ensure that 
cooling water intake structures reflect the “best technology available for 
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”113  In considering how to ful-
fill this statutory mandate for existing structures, the EPA might engage in 
outreach through public meetings and it might conduct research on how 
cooling water intake structures damage the environment.  After studying 
the problem, the EPA might determine that there are various technologies 
available to reduce the number of fish and other species killed in these 
structures (for example, such as mesh screens, or barrier nets), and that 
some technologies are more effective than others and should be used ac-
cordingly.  The costs of arriving at this decision constitute the EPA’s deci-
sion costs. 
After it has decided on an outcome, an agency must also decide what 
means, or instruments, it will use to pursue and communicate that out-
come.114  As we shall see, these instruments include the literature’s famil-
iar catalogue of adjudication, guidance documents, and rulemaking.115  But 
this set will also be broadened to consider the institutional dimensions of 
these instruments and others as well: for example, how the instruments are 
characterized by agencies (their significance determinations), the quality of 
information conveyed by their accompanying cost-benefit analyses, various 
timing decisions, and the internal coalitions built in support of an agency’s 
action. 
Returning to our simple example, once the EPA decides to regulate 
cooling water intake structures to reduce environmental harm, it can pur-
sue this approach through discrete, permitting decisions; a guidance doc-
ument describing various available technologies for facility-specific deter-
minations;116 or by eventually undertaking a rulemaking to set a standard 
or to mandate a particular technology.117  All of these instruments vary in 
their form and impact, and the discretion to use them can be constrained 
by statute; such a statute may dictate specific forms of action, the sub-
stance, or else provide directive timelines, among other restrictions.  With-
in these bounds, agencies will consider decision costs for themselves, as 
well as the reviewing costs the chosen instrument imposes on the executive 
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 113 This hypothetical is based loosely on the situation facing the EPA in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeep-
er, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009). 
 114 Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 351. 
 115 See, e.g., Magill, supra note 3, at 1396 (examining consequences of “administrative adjudication, 
legislative rulemaking, or the issuance of a guidance document”). 
 116 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Water Enforcement Permits Div., Draft Guidance for 
Evaluating the Adverse Impact of Cooling Water Intake Structures on the Aquatic Environment: Section 
316(b) P.L. 92-500 (1977). 
 117 See Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1503–04 (describing the EPA’s use of permitting decisions, guidance 
documents, and eventually rulemaking); Brief for the Federal Parties as Respondents Supporting Peti-
tioners at 5–7, Entergy, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589 and 07-597).  
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branch.  In other words, faced with the prospect of presidential review, 
agencies can choose among various instruments to advance their regulatory 
policies, but their choice will depend on the relative effectiveness of these 
instruments as well as the costs they expect to impose on the President to 
review them. 
To illustrate, say there is a Republican President in power who has 
campaigned on reducing the number of regulations and blocking the num-
ber of costly new ones.  The EPA knows that if it decides to pursue a poli-
cy through its permitting decisions for cooling water intake structures, then 
these adjudicatory decisions will not be subject to presidential review and 
are thus immune from reversal.  If the EPA chooses the guidance docu-
ment route, however, the EPA knows that the executive branch might re-
view the document, but that it will be more difficult to reverse since the 
document is not legally binding and so its effects are unclear.  For the 
same reasons, however, the instrument will be less effective in bringing 
about its desired policy changes.  Alternatively, the EPA is also aware that 
if it undertakes a rulemaking, it will likely be required to prepare a re-
source-intensive cost-benefit analysis.  Because of the Republican Presi-
dent’s business-friendly stance, the EPA is concerned that preparing a thor-
ough cost-benefit analysis may make it easier for the rule to be reversed 
since the analysis could reveal expensive burdens on industry.  
With these various choices, agencies can insulate their decisions from 
review by increasing the costs of review, thus decreasing the probability of 
reversal due to the President’s finite resource constraints.  In our example, 
the EPA could choose to issue a guidance document instead of a rule to re-
duce the policy’s visibility, therefore increasing the difficulty of review and 
reversal by the Republican President; but doing so would also bring about 
its policy changes less effectively given the nonbinding nature of guidance 
documents.  Alternatively, the EPA could produce a poor-quality cost-
benefit analysis when submitting a rule, thus increasing the costs of re-
view.  Both of these strategies would be examples of self-insulation, since 
in both cases the President would have to spend greater resources to identi-
fy, review, and justify a reversal. 
To avoid reversal, then, agencies may trade off their own “institutional 
efficiency” — the ability to achieve some outcome through a lower-cost 
instrument in favor of a higher-cost one118 — provided that the selected 
instrument imposes even greater reviewing costs on the executive 
branch.119  In other words, agencies will pursue a policy as close to its 
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 118 Agency adjudication and guidance documents, for example, yield lower impacts given that agen-
cies must proceed on a case-by-case basis or else rely on legally nonbinding guidance to advance a reg-
ulatory policy.  By contrast, rulemaking is more effective in implementing a policy, though the absolute 
degree of that impact will depend on the substance of the rule.  See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Para-
digms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1981). 
 119 See Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 351–52. 
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preferences as possible, through a strategic instrument choice that takes in-
to account, among other things, the costs imposed upon the reviewer and 
the corresponding likelihood of presidential reversal. 
2.  Presidential Reversals. — The power to review implies the ability to 
examine something again (“re-view”) as well as the authority to instruct an 
agent or subordinate based on that evaluation.120  Whether that presidential 
authority is directive or supervisory is a matter of much academic de-
bate,121 but as a practical matter against the backdrop of at-will removal, 
presidential review shares several structural similarities with judicial re-
view.  Namely, OIRA can effectively reverse an agency action on behalf of 
the President and his interagency reviewers in a number of ways.122  Just 
as agencies can choose regulatory instruments, the President also has vari-
ous reversal instruments at his disposal.  They are “reversals” in the sense 
that the interagency-review process can result in revisions or changes that 
the agency does not otherwise prefer, but to which it will make due to the 
threat of delay or return, or because of resource constraints.123  These re-
versal instruments can be arrayed in terms of their respective reviewing 
costs, which increase the more public the reversal and correspondingly, the 
more reasoned the explanation required for it. 
To begin, OIRA can “return” a rule to an agency “for further considera-
tion of some or all of its provisions.”124  While this procedure is infre-
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 120 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1434 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “review” as the “[c]onsideration, in-
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an agent or subordinate, including the right to remand, modify, or vacate any action by the agent or 
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 122 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 9–10). 
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cepts the revisions “quickly and with enthusiasm.”  See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 10); 
supra note 101.     
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quently invoked, the threat is real and has, at times, been vigorously exer-
cised.  For each return, the Administrator of OIRA provides a “return let-
ter”125 that contains “a written explanation for such return.”126  The paral-
lel to judicial reversal and remand is likely clear.  Aside from agency-head 
removal, return letters are the most costly reversal instrument because they 
require a public rationale.  During the first seven years after President 
Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 — from 1994 to 2000 — OIRA re-
turned only a handful of the 500 to 700 rules for which it coordinated re-
view: three rules in 1995, and four in 1997.127  Under the subsequent Bush 
Administration, by contrast, OIRA publicly posted forty-two return letters 
explaining various disagreements with the agencies’ rules.128  To date, the 
Obama Administration has issued only one.129  This pattern could suggest 
that more anti-regulatory Presidents incur fewer political costs relative to 
pro-regulatory ones when issuing public return letters. 
At the same time, however, “it is misleading to focus on the number of 
return letters as a measure of OIRA’s impact,” since executive branch re-
viewers may still be “acting aggressively” in their absence.130  Indeed, as 
part of the review process, interagency and White House reviewers can al-
so negotiate revisions to a draft rule before agreeing to a version upon 
which to conclude review with these changes.  Each time there is another 
round of comments or edits from reviewers, OIRA compiles and “trans-
mit[s]” them back to the agency.131  The agency can respond to these 
comments, make revisions, and circulate a new draft during the review pe-
riod, if it so chooses and to the extent time permits.132 
Regulatory submissions have a host of elements, including preambles, 
new and revised regulatory text, alternatives, effective dates, statutory in-
terpretations, as well as cost-benefit estimates, among other provisions.  
The regulatory actions can also take different forms, for example, as ad-
vance notices of proposed rulemaking or as interim final rules, and so on.  
Each of these agency “decisions” within a rule or about the form of a rule 
can be the subject of comment and possible reversal during the interagency 
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 125 GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 5. 
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review process.  These revisions can be loosely analogized to the multiple 
reversals and remands with instructions after judicial review in the course 
of serial litigation.133  Sometimes these multiple rounds of revision and in-
teragency review can be lengthy, resulting in significant delays.134 
To put this category of reversals into perspective, even seemingly mi-
nor revisions may upend the product of hard-won compromises with agen-
cies and external constituencies (including legislative staff, industry, and 
interest groups) as well as internal agency stakeholders amongst career 
staff and policy officials (including lawyers, economists, scientists, and 
policy analysts).135  Agencies, which have often spent sizeable resources 
throughout the rulemaking process, can be loathe to see these hard-won 
balances upset and their work overturned.  Of course, they may be indif-
ferent to particular revisions when the stakes are low; in other situations, 
however, the threat of reversal is costly and real. 
As for these reversal costs, the effective ability to insist on these revi-
sions will depend on the amount of political capital and resources required.  
Specifically, they will be a function of the resources necessary to com-
municate the issue to the agency or other interagency reviewers, whether 
in terms of briefings or meetings, as well as the political capital necessary 
to elevate the issue to higher-level officials and, ultimately, to refuse to 
conclude upon the rule in its current form.136  Evidence from a 2003 Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) report suggests that presidential re-
versals, even within a rule, are nontrivial in effect.  Specifically, the report 
finds that the review process resulted in “significant” or “material” chang-
es to fifty-one of the subset of eighty-five rules examined (sixty per-
cent).137  The report defined these changes as those made at a reviewer’s 
suggestion that “affected the scope, impact, or estimated costs and bene-
fits” of the submitted rules, or “resulted in the addition or deletion of ma-
terial in the explanatory preamble section of the rule.”138 
In addition to these dispositions, OIRA can also “encourage” an agency 
to “withdraw” a rule,139 presumably because the review reveals the likeli-
hood that OIRA, on behalf of executive branch reviewers, would not con-
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 133 See id. at 82 (discussing example including resubmission of multiple drafts of FDA rule during 
review); cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1722, 1722 (2011) (exploring dynamic whereby “courts and agencies carry out a revealing collo-
quy over the course of successive reviews and remands” during serial litigation). 
 134 See GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 46 (quoting President Clinton’s OIRA 
Administrator testifying that “when two or more agencies are at loggerheads over a regulatory issue, it 
may well take more than 90, or even 120, days to obtain needed data and analyses, to conduct the ap-
propriate evaluation, and to arrange for the policy officials in the interested agencies to come to agree-
ment”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 135 See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1036–41.   
 136 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 18–20) (discussing “elevation”). 
 137 See GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 73–75. 
 138 See id. at 73.  
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clude on the rule in its present form.140  The costs to the President of these 
withdrawals will depend on the stage of the rulemaking process.  Before 
an agency proposes a rule, it can quietly withdraw the rule before it pub-
lishes anything; however, OIRA’s public database notes the simple fact of 
withdrawal.141  Thus, at this point, the reversal costs are relatively low.  
But after an agency has already publicly proposed a rule, though not yet 
finalized it, the agency may unilaterally withdraw it without notice-and-
comment; however, the agency will have already made public its contem-
plated course of action.142  As a result, there will be greater costs to revers-
ing the agency and having it withdraw the rule at this stage, given that the 
President will feel more pressure from monitoring groups opposed to this 
action.143 
Finally, the review can also result in no revisions or changes to the rule 
at all.  The rule that was submitted to OIRA for review is the same as the 
rule upon which OIRA concludes review without change.  It has been af-
firmed.  Which reversal instrument the President ultimately chooses, in 
turn, will depend on these reviewing costs, his available resources, as well 
as how far his preferences diverge from those of the agency.144  If their 
preferences are sufficiently close — and the agency has used an instrument 
rendering reversal a costly enough proposition — then the President will 
affirm the agency’s decision.145  As the preference divergence grows and 
the lower the costs of reversal, the President will be more likely to reverse 
the agency.146  At some point, however, the preference divergence can be 
so great that the President will reverse the agency’s decision even if the 
cost required to do so is significant. 
II.  AGENCY SELF-INSULATION 
A.  Self-Insulation Mechanisms 
Faced with these reversal prospects, agencies as the first movers can 
choose from an array of regulatory instruments, each with different ex-
pected effects on presidential review.  An agency will, in turn, be more 
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likely to use those instruments that will insulate its decisions from review 
the more it expects presidential preferences to diverge from its own, all 
else being equal.  The agency’s equilibrium choice, then, will depend on 
its decision costs and the points at which it expects to avoid reversal,147 
background conditions for this section’s closer examination of the various 
ways in which agencies can attempt to raise the costs of review and ulti-
mately reversal.148  These self-insulation mechanisms are the institutional 
means through which agencies can render the process more resource-
intensive, thereby increasing the probability of insulation.  These mecha-
nisms can be classified in terms of their functional effects: to bypass re-
view, to decrease scrutiny, to truncate the amount of time available, or to 
facilitate successful internal coalitions.  They will each require their own 
respective decision costs,149 but they share the ability to help minimize the 
probability of reversal. 
1.  Bypass. — Presidential review currently covers “regulatory ac-
tion[s]” that are “significant.”150  Regulatory actions, in turn, include “any 
substantive action” that “promulgates or is expected to lead to the promul-
gation of a final rule or regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance 
notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices of proposed rulemaking.”151  
These provisions define the scope of regulatory review.  Any scope-
defining provision of an institutionalized review process, however, begets 
incentives for agencies to employ instruments that attempt to bypass the 
costly process entirely, and thus avoid the risk of reversal altogether.  
These instruments include: 
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 147 These points would depend on the President’s expected instruments and policy choices.  Cf. id. at 
371–73 (discussing equilibrium instruments and policy outcomes in the context of judicial review). 
 148 In other words, it examines the costs of the review process that will necessarily precede each of 
the President’s potential reversal instruments.   
 149 Bypass strategies may require higher decision costs relative to non-bypass strategies since they 
are largely efforts by agencies to switch to policymaking forms that are not or will not lead to legisla-
tive rulemakings.  Assuming that rules can induce greater policy changes relative to case-by-case adju-
dication or nonbinding guidance documents, bypass efforts are more internally costly (though an agen-
cy may trade these off for their effects on presidential review).  Cf. Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 
360–61.  Decreasing scrutiny, in turn, yields lower decision costs, because this strategy usually requires 
less of an investment in the substance and form of cost-benefit analysis.  The decision costs of timing 
strategies are harder to asses, though there is likely an internal cost to submitting a rule late given the 
need for more justification that must be provided to OIRA.  Finally, coalition-building efforts are more 
costly for the agency, and thus will likely be undertaken for rules with greater policy impacts or of 
more importance to the agency.  Each of these considerations may help to explain when agencies will 
choose among various self-insulation mechanisms; though this inter-instrumental choice is not consid-
ered in depth here, it may be an extension worthy of future exploration. 
 150 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1993). 
 151 Id. § 3(e). Such rules include any “agency statement of general applicability and future effect, 
which the agency intends to have the force and effect of law, that is designed to implement, interpret, or 
prescribe law or policy or to describe the procedure or practice requirements of an agency.” Id. § 3(d).  
This category does not include formal rulemaking, rules related to military and foreign affairs, among 
other enumerated exceptions.  Id. § 3(d)(1)-(4). 
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(a)  Inaction. — As stated, Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to 
submit “significant regulatory actions” to OIRA for presidential review.152  
If an agency does not affirmatively engage in regulatory action, this deci-
sion does not undergo presidential review.  According to a Congressional 
Research Service report, “some agencies have indicated that they do not 
even propose certain regulatory provisions because they believe that OIRA 
would find them objectionable.”153  An agency may choose not to act be-
cause of its own internal resource constraints or because of the threat of 
presidential review.  While the empirical outcome is the same — no new 
regulatory action — the distinction is still important to keep in mind as an 
analytic matter. 
Relative to the status quo, there are no affirmative impacts of agency 
inaction (by definition).  However, as others have noted, agency inaction 
can nonetheless have important consequences — for example, the failure 
to regulate a pollutant can have adverse impacts on public health — a de-
cision which is not currently subject to presidential review.154  While the 
consequences of agency inaction can indeed be significant, the decision 
facing the agency in the present analysis is whether to depart from the sta-
tus quo.  Relative to this baseline, a decision not to depart, not to act, can 
be understood as yielding no new, marginal impacts on the state of the 
world. 
(b)  Adjudication and Guidance Documents. — Agencies can also by-
pass presidential review by choosing an instrument other than “any sub-
stantive action” that “promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulga-
tion of a final rule or regulation.”155 One such instrument is that of 
adjudication.  This category of agency action could include benefits deter-
minations and licensing proceedings, among other actions.156  Because ad-
judication proceeds on a case-by-case basis relative to rulemaking, each 
one’s policy impacts are limited and aggregate policy change is developed 
only incrementally.  As a result, there is relatively little information to re-
view and, in any case, adjudication decisions are not subject to the presi-
dential review process.  Case studies of particular agencies — such as the 
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA), which 
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 152 Id. § 6(a)(3)(B). 
 153 COPELAND, supra note 15, at 18. 
 154 See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY 155–56 
(2008); Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 118–19 (2008). 
 155 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994).  This category does not include formal 
rulemaking or rules related to military and foreign affairs, among other enumerated exceptions.  See id. 
§ 3(d)(1)–(4).   
 156 Magill, supra note 3, at 1386; see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2006) (defining “order” as “the whole 
or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an 
agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing”); id. § 551(7) (defining “adjudica-
tion” as an “agency process for the formulation of an order”). 
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shifted from rulemaking to adjudication in the mid-1970s due in part to 
changes in presidential administrations — lend support to this dynamic.157  
As permitted by statute, courts have consistently allowed agencies to 
choose between these policymaking forms.158   
Alternatively, an agency could issue a guidance document.159  Guid-
ance documents are interpretive rules and statements of policy intended to 
clarify existing regulatory requirements, though they have often been criti-
cized as creating new obligations upon private parties without the tradi-
tional requirements imposed on legislative rulemaking.160  Guidance doc-
uments are exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-
comment requirements and thus less internally costly for the agency rela-
tive to rulemaking.161  In terms of their impacts, an agency can sometimes 
obtain voluntary compliance proportionate to its “gatekeeping” power over 
private parties, or else because savvy regulatory targets foresee forthcom-
ing policy shifts.162  However, as a practical matter, guidance documents 
are not legally binding, and are thus likely to be less effective relative to 
rulemaking in bringing about the desired behavioral changes.163  
“Significant” guidance documents, defined under a multifactor test in-
cluding expected economic impacts and policy novelty, are currently sub-
ject to presidential review.164  They garnered much attention in January 
2007, when President George W. Bush amended President Clinton’s execu-
tive order to formally subject such guidance documents to review, though 
the amendments have since been revoked.165  Around the time the order 
was amended, OMB also released its Final Bulletin for Agency Good 
Guidance Practices, which directed agencies to implement procedures for 
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 157 See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10–11 
(1990) (describing NHTSA’s “retreat[]” from rulemaking to “case-by-case adjudication,” id. at 11).  
Professors Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst also observe that while such retreats “have been responsive 
to general political shifts in regulatory zeal,” they are not only retreats “from regulation,” but “to regu-
lation in a different form.”  Id. at 14 (citing also the example of the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion as an agency that “turned from standard setting to recalls”).  
 158 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); see also Magill, supra note 3, at 1385 (describing courts’ largely “hands-
off” reaction to agencies’ choice of policymaking form).                 
 159 Note, of course, that guidance documents that initiate a process culminating in rulemaking would 
be covered under presidential review.  See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 15). 
 160 See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like 
— Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1332–55 (1992). 
 161 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) (exceptions for “interpretive rules” or “general statements of poli-
cy”). 
 162 See Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 
119 YALE L.J. 782, 803–04 (2010). 
 163 Id. at 803. 
 164 See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget 1 (Mar. 4, 2009), avail-
able at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf.  
 165 See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2007); Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2002); 
Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2009) (revoking amendments). 
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the approval and use of significant guidance documents by appropriate 
senior officials, sought to standardize the documents’ elements, and estab-
lished public access and feedback procedures.166 
Before then, presidential review of such documents was at best sporad-
ic, with one former OIRA Administrator, Sally Katzen, testifying that Clin-
ton’s executive order “was written to apply only where agencies undertook 
regulatory actions that had the force and effect of law,” and that she had 
“never reviewed a guidance document during her tenure in the Clinton 
administration.”167  After President Obama revoked the Bush amendments 
and returned to the un-amended Clinton executive order,168 however, OMB 
Director Peter Orszag issued a memorandum to agencies stating that OIRA 
had previously reviewed “significant policy and guidance documents” and 
that such documents remained subject to review.169 
Relative to rules, however, the review of guidance documents is much 
more limited and unsystematic in practice.170  This is partly because guid-
ance documents as a class are not required to undergo formal notice-and-
comment procedures, so there are fewer opportunities for fire-alarm over-
sight by outside monitoring groups regarding each document’s signifi-
cance, making the agency’s own initial significance determination that 
much more critical.171  In addition, guidance documents that are not ex-
pected to lead to a final regulation are not required by executive order to 
provide a cost-benefit analysis, further limiting the information about their 
potential impacts and therefore their potential significance to the Presi-
dent.172  Finally, the sheer number of such documents likely constrains the 
amount of time available to review each one.173  To be sure, many agen-
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 166 See Paul R. Noe & John D. Graham, Due Process and Management for Guidance Documents, 25 
YALE J. ON REG. 103, 103 n.1 (2008); see also Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 
Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432–33 (Jan. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Final Bulletin], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf. 
 167 Id. at 105 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168 See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2009). 
 169 Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 164, at 1.  
 170 See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy  A Structural Perspective, 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 n.98 (2008) (noting that “OIRA’s analysis of these guidance documents 
(even ‘significant’ guidance documents that have an estimated impact of $100 million or more on the 
economy) is much more limited than its analysis of regulations”).  
 171 OMB’s good guidance practices do, however, provide that “[e]ach agency shall maintain on its 
Web site . . . a current list of its significant guidance documents in effect” and “shall establish and 
clearly advertise on its Web site a means for the public to submit comments electronically on significant 
guidance documents . . . .”  Final Bulletin, supra note 166, at 3440.  For “economically significant” 
guidance documents, the bulletin states that agencies “shall” generally provide notice and invite public 
comment.  Id.  Many agencies follow these procedures, but note that they rely upon the agency’s own 
assessment of what constitutes a “significant” or “economically significant” guidance document, raising 
the same issues as significance determinations for rules.  See infra section II.A.1.(c). 
 172 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(e), 3(e), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1993). 
 173 See Noe & Graham, supra note 166, at 104 (“Each year, agencies issue on the order of 4000 reg-
ulations, and the number of guidance documents is orders of magnitude larger.”) (citations omitted). 
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cies will be hesitant to “issue important regulatory documents that have not 
been seen by, or (if appropriate) incorporated the perspectives of, senior 
officials inside the Administration.”174  But when the question of signifi-
cance is sufficiently close or ambiguous enough from the agency’s per-
spective, the perceived costs of review may well outweigh the potential 
benefits to the agency. 
(c)  Non-Significant Rules. — Recall again that Executive Order 12,866 
requires agencies to submit “significant” regulatory actions to OIRA for 
presidential review.175  If choosing rulemaking as a regulatory instrument, 
agencies can thus prevent review by avoiding a determination that the rule 
is “significant.”  To be significant, a regulatory action must meet at least 
one of four sets of flexible criteria: it might raise potential inconsistencies 
with other agencies, “materially alter the budgetary impact of” certain pro-
grams, invoke “novel legal or policy issues,” or be economically signifi-
cant.176 
Significance determinations rely on agencies to identify such rules “in 
the first instance, vetted by OIRA.”177  Because the burden is initially on 
the agencies to highlight significant rules, OIRA must rely on them to flag 
them as such, or at least give enough information to enable it to make an 
independent determination.  Rules that an agency does not identify as sig-
nificant are thus more likely to go unnoticed.  Various tools exist to facili-
tate this determination, but the information they provide is often framed so 
generally as to limit the ability for meaningful, external evaluation.  For 
example, agencies are required by executive order to submit entries semi-
annually to the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory 
Actions, a compilation of regulatory activities planned during the next 
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 174 Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 15). 
 175 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1993). 
 176 Id. § (3)(f).  The text in full states:  
  ‘Significant regulatory action’ means any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that 
may: (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a materi-
al way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public 
health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) Create a serious inconsisten-
cy or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3) Materially alter the 
budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of 
recipients thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s 
priorities, or the principles set forth in this Executive order.”   
  Id.  OMB’s Circular A-4 states that “Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct a regu-
latory analysis for economically significant regulatory actions as defined by Section 3(f)(1).”  Circular 
A-4, supra note 75, at 1. 
 177 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 223 (William F. Funk et al., 4th ed. 
2008); see also Memorandum from Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
and Independent Regulatory Agencies (Apr. 25, 2007) (referring to process for agencies to request “sig-
nificance determinations”).  
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twelve months.178  These entries include, among other things, a short de-
scription of the rule, as well as the agency’s priority designations — 
roughly, whether the agency believes the action to be non-significant, sig-
nificant, or economically significant.179  In addition, at specified intervals, 
agencies provide OIRA with simple lists of planned regulations indicating 
which ones they believe are significant or not.180  Actions that do not ap-
pear on either of these are more prone to slip through the cracks. 
Moreover, many of the criteria, including the question of novelty, for 
significance determinations are “hardly self-defining,”181 and agencies may 
have good-faith but nevertheless ill-informed reasons for excluding some 
rules and designating them as non-significant.  Even if an agency has ini-
tially classified a regulatory action as non-significant, the executive order 
gives OIRA just ten days to determine otherwise, a narrow window of time 
in which to resolve staff-level disagreements and elevate them if neces-
sary.182  In this manner, by choosing a non-significant rulemaking form, 
agencies can limit the amount of information for review, as well as make 
such review less likely.183 
Take, for example, a recent USDA direct final rule (DFR) that would 
require all USDA contractors to certify that they, their subcontractors, and 
suppliers are “in compliance with all applicable labor laws,” subjecting the 
contractor to liability under the False Claims Act if their certification is in-
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 178 U.S. Gen. Srvs. Admin., Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101114 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013); see Exec. Order No. 12,866 
§ 4(c), 3 C.F.R. at 642 (2011).   
 179 More specifically, agencies can prioritize the rule as:  
  (1) “Economically Significant”; (2) “Other Significant” “[t]his category “includes rules that the 
agency anticipates will be reviewed under Executive Order 12866 or rules that are a priority of the 
agency head”); (3) “Substantive, Non-significant” “a rulemaking that has substantive impacts but is 
neither Significant, nor Routine and Frequent, nor Informational/Administrative/Other”); (4) “Routine 
and Frequent” “a specific case of a multiple recurring application of a regulatory program in the Code 
of Federal Regulations and that does not alter the body of the regulation”; or (5) “Information-
al/Administrative/Other” “[a] rulemaking that is primarily informational . . . but that the agency places 
in the Unified Agenda to inform the public of the activity”). 
  REGULATORY INFO. SERV. CTR., INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFIED AGENDA OF FEDERAL 
REGULATORY AND DEREGULATORY ACTIONS (2011), available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/201110/Preamble_8888.html. 
 180 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 645.  Shortly after the implementation of 
the Clinton Order, OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen reported that OIRA believed that “so far, the list-
ing system that has been implemented contains both discipline and flexibility.  Both OIRA staff and 
agency staff have worked to accommodate each other’s needs.”  Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Of-
fice of the President, Report on Executive Order No. 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 24,276, 24,286 (May 10, 1994).  
 181 Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 14). 
 182 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 642. 
 183 A report on the implementation of Clinton’s executive order relayed that the definition of “signif-
icance” had been the subject of great discussion and delay.  “Some of the disagreements,” the report 
hypothesized, “may be attributable to the difference in the natural inclinations of rule writers, who 
might prefer not to have another review layer to go through . . . .” Report on Executive Order No. 
12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 59 Fed. Reg. at 24,277 (May 10, 1994).  
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correct.184  Direct final rules are promulgated without prior notice and 
comment and become effective at some point after publication in the Fed-
eral Register unless “adverse” comments are received.185  In this case, the 
Federal Register reported that USDA’s DFR was designated as “not signif-
icant according to Executive Order 12866 and therefore the rule has not 
been reviewed by OMB.”186  Commenters raised numerous objections, in-
cluding claims that the provisions were too vague or burdensome, and 
highly controversial.187  One commenter asserted that “USDA’s handling 
of this regulation as a DFR suggests that in seeking OMB’s clearance, the 
Department characterized this [as] a minor language change and noncon-
troversial . . . suggest[ing] that the agency was being disingenuous in its 
submission to OMB.”188  The accuracy or inaccuracy of this charge aside, 
given the substance of the rule and the resulting reactions, there is certain-
ly a plausible argument that the rule was “significant” as a novel legal or 
policy issue, and thus should have been subject to presidential review.  
Even if OIRA had this information and disagreed, the example simply il-
lustrates how self-identified non-significant rules can render presidential 
review more difficult. 
*** 
To summarize thus far, agencies can choose between simple inaction, 
adjudication, guidance documents, or non-significant rules as instruments 
that are more likely as a class to bypass presidential review.  They vary in 
terms of their policy impacts and thus effectiveness.  For a resource-
constrained agency, adjudication may be less effective than guidance doc-
uments, which are themselves less effective than non-significant rules.  At 
the same time, each of these instruments may still be attractive to the 
agency because they are exempt from review altogether or contain limited 
amounts of information to review, thus making them more difficult to re-
verse.  Others have certainly recognized that agencies may strategically 
choose less costly instruments, such as guidance documents over rulemak-
ing, but they have done so largely in the context of courts189 or Con-
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 184 Agriculture Acquisition Regulation, Labor Law Violations, 76 Fed. Reg. 74722 (to be codified at 
48 CFR 422) (Dec. 1, 2011) (direct final rule); 76 Fed. Reg. 74755 (Dec. 1, 2011) (proposed rule). 
 185 See Michael Kolber, Rulemaking Without Rules  An Empirical Study of Direct Final Rulemaking, 
72 ALB. L. REV. 79, 81 (2009). 
 186 76 Fed. Reg. at 74723, 74756. 
 187 Letter from Chamber of Commerce to Lisa M. Wilusz, Director, Office of Procurement and 
Property Management 14 (Jan. 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/comments/120124usdablistcommentsDFR.pdf. 
 188 See id.  (arguing that rule raised “novel legal and policy issues” and could “adversely affect in a 
material way the sector of the economy defined by companies that contract with the USDA” and thus 
should have been reviewed by OIRA); Letter from Equal Employment Advisory Council to the Office 
of Procurement and Property Management (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.eeac.org/public/12-
022a.pdf  (raising similar concerns). 
 189 See sources cited supra note 3. 
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gress.190  This discussion seeks to bring the President more firmly back in-
to the picture in light of actors’ respective budget constraints.191 
2.  Scrutiny Calibration. — Even if an agency is unable to bypass re-
view, it can also attempt to calibrate the level of scrutiny the regulatory ac-
tion receives during the review process.  The term “scrutiny” here is a con-
scious one: just as heightened levels of judicial scrutiny imply that an 
appellate judge will afford less deference to the court below, so too in the 
context of presidential review.  Agencies that successfully lower the scruti-
ny of review essentially raise the costs of potential reversal, as the Presi-
dent would have to use greater resources to identify and target those regu-
latory decisions with which he disagrees. 
Economically significant rules are more likely than (merely) significant 
ones to garner scrutiny because higher cost or benefit rules are more likely 
to be politically salient.  They are the rules to which the President will pay 
the most attention.  Public logs also reveal that such rules are more likely 
to become the subject of meetings between OIRA staff and non-
governmental parties, suggesting heightened public scrutiny as well.192  
Economically significant rules are also required to provide a more rigorous 
and transparent cost-benefit analysis.193  As a result, “[t]he level of scruti-
ny” of presidential review is “strongly influenced by the agency’s informed 
and presumptively good-faith initial designation of a regulation 
as . . . ‘significant,’ or ‘economically significant.’”194  The more likely an 
agency is to designate a rule as economically significant and to provide a 
more transparent cost-benefit analysis, the higher the likelihood of presi-
dential scrutiny.  
To qualify as economically significant, the main criterion is that a rule 
must be expected to result in “an annual effect on the economy of $100 
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 190 See, e.g., James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of 
Rulemaking Procedures  The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 112–13 (1994).  While Hamilton and Schroeder recognize that 
“[i]nformality . . . offers a means for regulators to evade both the constraints imposed by Congress and 
the courts and the executive branch oversight exercised by OMB,” their discussion continuously empha-
sizes only the legislature and the judiciary.  Id. at 147 (emphasis added).  For example, their next sen-
tences provide:  
We do not claim that these informal rules go unnoticed by the legislative and judicial branch-
es, just as slack does not go unnoticed in general principal-agent relationships.  Rather, courts 
and Congress must weigh the costs of monitoring and punishing agencies against the costs 
posed by agency discretion embodied in informal rules. 
Id. at 147–48. 
 191 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 
381, 404–08 (arguing that agency internal budget constraints influence the choice of guidance docu-
ments). 
 192 See Croley, supra note 36, at 844, 871–72. 
 193 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645–46 (1993).   
 194 Declaration of Richard B. Belzer at 9, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 178-2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 27, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.rbbelzer.com/uploads/7/1/7/4/7174353/tafas_ex-21-belzer-declaration.pdf (describing 
experience as career civil service economist at OIRA from November 1988 until September 1998). 
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million or more.”195  This threshold currently applies to the impact of reg-
ulatory actions “in any one year and it [also] includes benefits, costs, or 
transfers” — that is, “$100 million in annual benefits, or costs, or trans-
fers” would be sufficient, while $50 million in benefits and $49 million in 
costs would not be.196  In light of this threshold, accounts sometimes in-
correctly state that OIRA staff members conduct cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) in the first instance, as if to suggest that OIRA actually calculates 
the expected costs and benefits of a regulation.197  In fact, however, agen-
cies first prepare the analyses and send the supporting documents to OIRA, 
which then coordinates a review with various other executive branch enti-
ties.  This distinction is important because of the incentives that exist for 
the agency during the CBA preparation stage — in anticipation of that re-
view. 
Cost-benefit analysis means many things to different people,198 yet at-
tempts to provide a coherent theoretical basis199 belie the highly variable 
ways in which agencies conduct it in practice.  Some agencies prepare 
what could be best described as a back-of-the envelope estimation of regu-
latory impacts200 — a rough accounting of the pros and cons of a rule — 
while others undertake (or more commonly, contract out) expensive and 
sophisticated efforts to collect data from market-behavior or consumer 
willingness-to-pay studies about a rule’s monetized costs and benefits.201  
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 195 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 641.  Alternatively, the action could also “adversely 
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the envi-
ronment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities . . . .”  Id.  These 
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simplicity, this Article focuses only on the $100 million-dollar threshold. 
 196 OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (Feb. 7, 2011) (emphasis removed), available at 
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 197 See, e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 57 (“OIRA staff members are the ones who 
actually conduct cost-benefit analyses.”); Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Turning the Page on the 
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Agencies also vary in terms of how they discount these effects, the extent 
to which they describe costs and benefits qualitatively as opposed to quan-
titatively, and the number of alternatives they explicitly consider, among 
numerous other factors.202 
 Given such discretion and the wide array of practices, agencies can 
attempt to insulate their regulatory decisions through CBA preparation in 
multiple ways.  First, they can work to avoid the designation of economic 
significance altogether and thus decrease the amount of presidential scruti-
ny.  Reports from former OIRA officials, for example, suggest that agen-
cies may avoid determinations of economic significance by splitting rules 
into parts — each of which falls beneath the $100 million threshold.203  
So, for example, an economically significant rule with an expected impact 
of $150 million in a given year could be split into two separate rules, each 
of which is expected to cost $75 million in that year.  Neither of these 
rules would now be designated as economically significant, thus effective-
ly lowering the scrutiny of review.  Similarly, agencies could also choose 
discount rates that decrease the expected costs or benefits, or place greater 
weight on particular cost-benefit studies in the literature which predict 
minimal economic impacts, all in attempts to remain under the threshold.  
Alternatively, even if efforts to avoid a determination of economic sig-
nificance are unsuccessful, agencies can make choices regarding the sub-
stance and form of a CBA that have self-insulating effects.204  As under-
stood here, the substance of a CBA refers to the strength of the data 
supporting the analysis and the conclusions drawn from it, while its form 
goes to how an expert agency communicates the results of its analysis to a 
more generalist audience.  The two dimensions are certainly related, but 
they can be isolated.  When preparing a CBA, an agency faces separate re-
source decisions regarding how much to invest in expertise when reaching 
its decisions, as well as how to present its CBA at the point of presidential 
submission before the rule is publicly released.  Stated differently, it can 
make distinct choices regarding its own private information and the infor-
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mation it presents to presidential reviewers, subject, of course, to any ex-
ogenous data limitations. 
Regarding the agency’s own investment in research and expertise,205 
the more an agency invests in such research, the more costly it becomes 
for the President to contest the agency’s decision.  Competing expertise 
from experts within the executive branch would now be necessary in order 
to engage the agency on its terms.206  In other words, the stronger the 
technical substance of the CBA, the more resource-intensive the review 
process required to engage with and dispute the agency’s findings.  Rever-
sal costs are also raised if the President decides, instead, to politicize the 
data by exerting pressure on the agency head to alter or suppress the anal-
ysis.  Not only does this require more political capital by the President, but 
it also raises the risk that the agency can informally release (or credibly 
threaten to release) its underlying data to oversight bodies that can more 
readily check the President.  In this manner, an agency can effectively in-
sulate through expertise.207 
Even when an agency possesses the internal expertise to justify and ar-
rive at its regulatory decision, however, it still faces a distinct choice as to 
how to communicate and present this decision to nonspecialists like the 
President — a process of translation from unstated assumptions to clearly 
stated ones, from jargon to plain English, from the use of complex appen-
dices to executive summaries, and so on.  That is, agencies can choose to 
initially submit an economically significant rule accompanied by a poorly 
translated CBA, which requires higher reviewing costs, or a well-
translated CBA, which requires less.  A well-translated CBA, as defined 
here, refers to analysis that adheres to the best practices outlined in recent 
executive orders and OIRA guidance documents, which generally promote 
principles of clarity, consistency, and analytic rigor.208  In particular, 
OMB’s 2003 Circular A-4 provides that, in order to be a “good analysis,” 
it must be a “transparent” one that states “what assumptions were used, 
such as the time horizon for the analysis and the discount rates applied to 
future benefits and costs,” along with “a sensitivity analysis to reveal 
whether, and to what extent, the results of the analysis are sensitive to 
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plausible changes in the main assumptions and numeric inputs.”209  A 
well-translated CBA generally requires greater investments of agency re-
sources to lucidly present the resulting analysis upon submission to the 
President.210 
Rules with a well-translated CBA impose lower reviewing costs be-
cause they provide a greater amount of readily useable information upon 
which to internally debate a policy decision within the executive branch.  
More of the review time can be spent discussing the appropriate regulatory 
alternatives based on the information gained through CBA, rather than at-
tempting to clarify assumptions or extract data sources from the agency 
through costly phone calls, meetings, and so on.  Indeed, one important 
function of presidential review, as discussed, is analytic: to convert poorly 
translated CBAs to well-translated ones, not only to provide better infor-
mation to the President, but also to other political monitors in anticipation 
of the notice-and-comment process.  In this manner, agencies can effec-
tively force more of the review to be spent contesting the form rather than 
the substance of the CBA and, in doing so, reduce the likelihood that the 
decision will be reversed on the merits.211 
To illustrate, consider this account from a former OIRA official: 
On the first level, we use common sense.  If a reasonably intelligent lay 
person is reading through the supporting documentation for the rule, could he 
reach the same result?  Is there a reasonably clear documentation of the major 
effects?  If we can’t tell what is going on, we send it back.  We look for objec-
tives, alternatives, costs, and benefits. 
. . . . 
Occasionally, we have the luxury of getting into sophisticated issues, such as 
calculating the discount rate and how sensitive the predictions are to the dis-
count rates.  Unfortunately, we do not always have time for this.212 
In this manner, the extent to which a poorly translated CBA can be im-
proved will be a function of the resources and time (usually ninety days) 
available to engage in the iterative process of (1) interagency review; (2) 
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comments, suggestions, and questions arising from that review and sent 
back to the agency; (3) further review of the resulting revisions, if any, and 
so on.  A poorly translated CBA will often result in the rule being sent 
back to the agency, often more than once, with questions and comments 
designed to clarify and, sometimes, contest the analytic basis. 
As a result, agencies will often have an incentive to choose a poorly 
translated CBA instead of a well-translated one at the point of presidential 
submission (though it may expect to eventually improve the CBA by the 
time the review process is complete), since doing so will be more likely to 
insulate the rule by increasing review costs.  One EPA official, for exam-
ple, has “candidly” observed that “EPA has written many rules [the way 
that it has, partially,] because of a desire . . . to obfuscate in order to get 
the rules through the regulatory and [OMB] approval process.”213 
At the same time, the net effect of a poorly translated CBA on the 
probability of reversal may well be ambiguous if the form of a CBA also 
serves as a negative signal for the underlying substance.214  Reviewers 
could interpret a confusing CBA as an indication that the substance of the 
rule is also poor, thus becoming more likely to reverse it.  One might simi-
larly argue that when agencies have rules that are substantively strong on 
the merits, they would have a cross-cutting incentive to submit a well-
translated CBA to signal the rule’s strength.  Both are compelling possibili-
ties, but note that for reviewers to even reach a conclusion on the merits, 
they would still have to spend time and resources engaging with the agen-
cy in order to clarify the underlying CBA substance before contesting it.  
This epistemic disadvantage results in higher resource costs at the margin 
and can thus yield insulating effects.215  Regardless, because of these 
cross-cutting potential dynamics, identifying which effects would ulti-
mately dominate is ambiguous in theory and must thus be tested against 
available data.216 
This concept of poorly translated CBA as a self-insulation mechanism 
builds upon the work of others that have considered CBA as a strategic 
means of acquiring information about a project’s net value,217 but now 
broadens the institutional lens to consider how a CBA’s form can also fa-
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cilitate or hinder the review process itself.  In doing so, it distinguishes the 
more well-known incentives for agencies to augment net benefits in order 
to increase a regulatory action’s perceived value, and turns instead to the 
ways in which a CBA’s presentation at the point of submission can impose 
higher or lower reviewing costs. 
3.  Timing Strategies. — In addition to choosing regulatory instruments 
designed to bypass review and calibrate its scrutiny, agencies can also ef-
fectively truncate the time available for review, such that the President will 
be able to review and reverse a fewer number of decisions either within or 
across rules.  Recall that in response to the criticism during previous ad-
ministrations that “delay was OIRA’s tactic of choice for stifling costly 
new regulations,”218 President Clinton’s executive order imposed a ninety-
day cap subject to a thirty-day extension on the amount of time available 
for review,219 which itself could be extended for “whatever length [the 
agency] deems appropriate.”220  While the Clinton Administration appears 
not to have enforced the deadlines vigorously, accounts suggest that they 
were more strictly enforced beginning with George W. Bush’s OIRA Ad-
ministrator, who specifically instructed his staff “that no rule will stay 
longer than 90 days at OMB without my personal authorization.”221 
The best way to understand this initial ninety-day clock is as a timing 
default rule: a presumption that review should be complete within that pe-
riod after which there are increased political costs for extending the re-
view.  Those costs can be in the form of greater scrutiny from outside in-
terest groups,222 as well as congressional oversight hearings or letters.223  
As a result, agencies can insulate themselves from political control by at-
tempting to truncate the amount of time effectively available for review.  
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Managing that amount of time reduces the number of issues that can be 
raised and resolved during the process and thereby increases the pressure 
for reviewers to prioritize issues and ignore others that might have other-
wise been subject to reversal. 
This dynamic is strongest in the context of rules with judicial and 
statutory deadlines, though it applies to other internal administration dead-
lines, such as announcements or high-profile events as well.  Both courts 
and Congress can impose deadlines on agency action, including ones to 
commence or complete an action by a specified date.224  The Hazardous 
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984,225 for example, contained more 
than sixty statutory deadlines for the issuance of specific regulations re-
garding the land disposal of hazardous waste.226  As another example, the 
Defenders of Wildlife and the National Audubon Society sued the Depart-
ment of Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service in 2007, alleging the depart-
ment’s failure to implement an adequate plan governing off-road vehicle 
use.227  In April 2008, the plaintiffs agreed to a consent decree, which es-
tablished a judicial deadline of April 1, 2011, for the final rule.228  While 
agencies are able to comply with only a fraction of these deadlines in prac-
tice,229 such deadlines can nonetheless be powerful motivations for expe-
dited behavior. 
A number of courts, in turn, have held that the presidential review pro-
cess cannot delay the promulgation of regulations subject to such dead-
lines.230  In Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,231 for example, the 
district court noted that “OMB has no authority to use its regulatory re-
view . . . to delay promulgation . . . beyond the date of a statutory dead-
line.”232  Similarly, the D.C. Circuit found an Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) rule to be lawful despite the fact that OMB 
still had objections by the time the final rule was issued under a judicial 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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deadline.233  As a result, statutory and judicial deadlines potentially “let the 
agencies ‘game’ OMB by holding rules and analyses until the last minute” 
and, in effect, truncate the amount of available review time.234  In other 
words, agencies can wait to submit rules to OIRA less than ninety days be-
fore the applicable deadline, thereby insulating various aspects of the rule. 
Even in the absence of statutory or judicial deadlines, agencies have 
other means with which to reduce effectively the amount of review time 
devoted to a given rule.  For example, they could submit a number of 
lengthy, economically significant rules all at once to the same desk officer, 
thereby reducing the amount of time the desk officer can devote to each 
rule.  Some observers of the presidential review process also describe a 
practice involving the addition of provisions to draft rules as bargaining 
chips that “would be available” for agencies “to give away” or negotiate 
during presidential (or later, judicial) review in order to protect what they 
perceive as the most important provisions of a rule.235  If common or 
widespread, this practice would allow agencies to spend significant 
amounts of time during the review negotiating provisions that distract from 
others that are, in reality, more important to them. 
4.  Coalition-Building. — Even if an agency is unable to bypass review, 
calibrate its scrutiny, or truncate the amount of time available, it can also 
insulate its decisions by building coalitions with the multiple actors in-
volved in the review process —  career civil servants, other executive 
branch agencies, or the various entities within the Executive Office of the 
President.  This overall strategy would amount to increasing the costs of 
review and reversal, given that more resources will need to be spent “me-
diating” the disagreements between more actors, or “elevating” them to in-
creasingly higher levels of decisionmakers.236  Concretely, these resource 
costs could include the staff time required to brief relevant policy officials, 
as well as the efforts required to plan, schedule, and attend meetings.  At 
the same time, of course, this strategy would also raise the agency’s own 
decision and transaction costs, so will likely be engaged when most valua-
ble.237  Accordingly, this section now relaxes the assumption that the 
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“President” is a singular entity to give way to a more nuanced considera-
tion of the President and his multiple agents.238 
The Executive Office of the President (EOP) manifests the “institution-
al response” to the President’s need for various monitors to gather infor-
mation about a vast bureaucracy.239  First established by executive order in 
1939, the original Executive Office consisted of the White House Office, 
the Office of Management and Budget, the National Resources Planning 
Board, the Office of Government Reports and “such office for emergency 
management as the President shall determine.”240  The number and nature 
of entities within the EOP has evolved over the years, but some of the 
most enduring include: the White House Office (containing, for example, 
the Domestic Policy Council241 and the National Economic Council242); 
the Office of Management and Budget; the Council of Economic Advisors; 
the National Security Council; the Council on Environmental Quality; and 
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, among others.243 
(a)  Career Staff.  — Of these entities, the largest is the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB), which consists of a number of offices, in-
cluding OIRA, several “resource management offices” that evaluate and 
review budget requests, and others as well.244  OMB differs from most 
other units within the Executive Office of the President in that it has a staff 
consisting primarily of career civil servants.245  As such, it can offer assis-
tance and advice to the President from expertise gained through institu-
tional memory and experience.  Within OIRA, the Administrator is ap-
pointed by the President and Senate-confirmed, and in addition to other 
members of its political leadership, there are also about forty to fifty career 
staff, as well as a Deputy Administrator, who serves as the senior career 
manager.246  Of this already small staff, only about twenty to thirty con-
sistently engage in regulatory review.  They include “desk officer[s]” and 
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their supervisors, “branch chief[s]” who supervise and oversee portfolios 
of agencies and substantive policy areas.247 
Many desk officers have been at OIRA for many years, though some 
depart after only a few.  Some of the more senior career staff, including 
the branch chiefs, are also veterans of several administrations and thus 
possess institutional knowledge and experience.248  The same is true of 
the resource management offices with whom OIRA “may work closely.”249  
As a result, many of the career staff have developed productive and 
longstanding professional relationships with other career staff at the rule-
making agencies.  These relationships are likely mutually beneficial for fa-
cilitating their repeated transactions and to amicably resolving difficult and 
often technical issues.250  Because of these relationships and longer time 
horizons, however, there is an incentive for agency career staff to insulate 
their decisions by resolving issues at the staff level — with those in OMB 
or other agencies involved in the interagency review process — rather than 
allowing them to be subject to greater political, and thus more uncertain, 
scrutiny.251 
The decision whether to elevate an issue to higher-level decisionmakers 
will likely depend on the respective staff members’ senses of the political 
dynamics and whether their arguments might prevail during the resulting 
negotiations.  In the words of one OIRA desk officer, “It’s embarrassing to 
raise something up and to get knocked down . . . . So people specifically 
think about that question, and try to anticipate whether they’re going to get 
[political] support or not.  And if you don’t think you are, you don’t waste 
the person’s time a lot of the times.”252 
Because they have been working together for longer periods of time, 
agency career staff may prefer to resolve issues with other staff members 
they know, and whose viewpoints may thus be more familiar.  The threat 
of elevation can in this manner serve as a stick.  While the potential for 
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preference divergence between civil servants and political appointees is 
well known,253 even when preferences are aligned, agencies still save re-
sources by resolving issues at the staff level.  Of course, in situations when 
an agency thinks it is more likely to get support from a higher-level deci-
sionmaker, then this incentive is reduced and elevation is preferable, de-
spite the greater resource costs. 
(b)  White House Offices and Other Executive Agencies. — The litera-
ture is rife with misleading references to “OIRA review,” as if to suggest 
that OIRA is the only office engaging in the review process.254  But presi-
dential review is not bilateral; rather, it involves multiple actors and re-
viewers, of which OIRA is but one, though it does serve a central, coordi-
nating function — what Cass Sunstein refers to as that of a “convener” or 
“facilitator.”255  After an agency submits a rule for review, “the relevant 
OIRA desk officer . . . will generally circulate the rule to a wide range of 
offices and departments, both within the Executive Office of the President 
and outside of it.”256  The decision regarding which offices should see the 
rule will likely depend on a number of factors, including whether the of-
fice is perceived to have relevant information and expertise,257 or has oth-
erwise expressed an interest in the rule.  These EOP entities often include: 
the National Economic Council; the Council of Economic Advisors; the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy; the United States Trade Repre-
sentative; the Council on Environmental Quality; the Domestic Policy 
Council; the National Security Council; the White House Counsel; the Of-
fice of Management and Budget; the Office of the Vice President; and the 
Office of Legislative Affairs.258 
In this manner, any number of other agencies and EOP entities, from 
only a few to many, could be involved in the review of a rule, depending 
on the political visibility and substance of the regulation at stake.  As it re-
ceives comments and questions back from these reviewers, OIRA staff will 
often add their own before transmitting them back to the agency.259  OIRA 
then coordinates a process whereby it attempts to help refine and resolve 
arising issues through multiple rounds of comments and questions, fol-
lowed by possible revisions and responses by the agency  During this pro-
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 253 See, e.g., Clinton et al., supra note 49, at 352 (“[O]ur estimates confirm that the preferences of 
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cess, the more the rulemaking agency has successfully built coalitions with 
other commenting entities, the more likely it is to insulate its decisions 
from reversal as the issue is discussed or elevated, since the review costs 
are now higher (in terms of requiring more meetings, briefings, and coor-
dination among a now greater number of actors).260    
To illustrate, consider Lisa Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh’s em-
pirical study relying on interviews with EPA senior political officials.  
They report that during the Bush I and Clinton Administrations, “[a]s 
many as nineteen White House offices were involved in EPA rule-
making.”261  Often, these White House offices fostered a “climate of inter-
nal combat and coalition-building” and “competed for influence over the 
content of . . . proposed rules, enlisting other offices, the vice president, 
and even the president himself to mediate the disputes.”262  EPA survey 
respondents reported that they sometimes turned to other White House of-
fices to bolster opposition to OIRA, and other offices and agencies made 
use of OIRA to combat the EPA.263  At other times, OIRA and the EPA 
could be allies against other offices and agencies.264  One commentator 
noted that “[n]ormal constituency groups” such as the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality and the Vice President often took EPA’s side when disa-
greements arose with other agencies, such as the Department of Energy.265 
Should disagreement among reviewers persist, Executive Order 
12,866’s conflict-resolution mechanism provides that “disagreements or 
conflicts between or among agency heads or between OMB and any agen-
cy . . . shall be resolved by the President, or by the Vice President acting at 
the request of the President . . . .”266  In practice, however, most disagree-
ments are resolved well before the issue is elevated to the presidential lev-
el.267  In this manner, the self-insulating agency can work during the re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 260 The normative value of self-insulation through coalition-building is ambiguous in that it will de-
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view process to garner support for a policy decision from particular re-
viewers that might hold sway in the White House.  When successful, such 
coalition-building efforts will raise the cost of review by increasing the 
amount of capital necessary to reverse the agency, as well as the time and 
resources necessary to resolve disputes.268 
B.  Applications 
While agencies can choose among regulatory instruments that vary in 
terms of their policy impacts and the amount of information available for 
review, the question of whether to self-insulate in the first place will itself 
depend on a number of factors.269  As presented here, an important factor 
is the probability of the potential preference divergence between the agen-
cy and the President.  That is, holding resources constant, agencies will be 
more likely to self-insulate the greater the chance that the President will 
have different preferences, thus resulting in likely reversal.  By contrast, if 
it expects the President to agree with its decisions, then the agency will be 
less likely to self-insulate.  In technical terms, an agency will be more like-
ly to choose the instrument likely to raise reviewing costs the greater the 
distance between the agency and the President’s expected ideal points.270  
With these dynamics in mind, this Section now considers some poten-
tial applications of the framework developed.  Generally speaking, the the-
ory bears on the agency’s choices at the point at which it submits a regula-
tory action for review, as a function of changes in expected preference 
divergence and decision costs.271  Insofar as this discussion marshals the 
decidedly-mixed existing evidence, it does so only to illustrate the plausi-
bility of the hypotheses generated.  Further empirical work would be nec-
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essary to test whether the variations in agency behavior can be explained 
systematically by the theory of self-insulation.  The modest hope here is to 
point in some potentially fruitful directions, as further data become availa-
ble.  Note that such future work, for example, could use the independent 
regulatory agencies as a control group, given that they are not subject to 
the formal presidential review process.272  It might also consider how to 
account for the potentially offsetting effects of greater politicization 
through appointments, and other related efforts to counter agency slack.273 
1.  Midnight Rulemaking. — One scenario in which agencies are better 
able to predict presidential preferences, relative to the status quo, is after 
the next President has been elected —  a situation ripe for “midnight rule-
making.”  Midnight rulemaking is the frenetic promulgation of regulations 
during the last ninety days of a presidential administration, particularly 
when the incoming President is from a different party.274  In these circum-
stances, executive agencies can expect more preference alignment during 
review from the current administration relative to the next one; thus, one 
would expect to see less self-insulation in these situations. 
Some empirical findings support this prediction.  One study, for exam-
ple, analyzes agency regulatory activity during midnight periods from Feb-
ruary 1981 through January 2009.275  First, it finds a statistically signifi-
cant increase in the total number of economically significant regulations 
submitted to OIRA during midnight periods relative to non-midnight peri-
ods.  Specifically, the monthly average number of economically significant 
rules rose by about six, roughly a fifty percent increase from the average 
quantity during the entire period.276  Other studies also show that agencies 
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issue rules with the most “highly visible” costs during midnight periods.277  
These results are consistent with the notion that agencies will choose to 
submit more economically significant rules over other instruments, such as 
non-significant rules, under conditions of expected preference alignment.  
That is, agencies will be less likely to self-insulate through instrument 
choice as the risks of presidential reversal decrease relative to the next 
administration.278  This choice not to self-insulate is likely aided by a 
White House eager to release the rules or otherwise “burrow” its policies 
before the change in power.279 
One would also expect this dynamic to hold with respect to an agen-
cy’s choice between significant rules and guidance documents.  Since the 
current President is perceived as more of an ally compared to the incoming 
one, on this view, an agency will shift away from self-insulation as a strat-
egy by choosing rulemaking relative to guidance documents, which are 
more difficult to review.  One empirical investigation examines the ratio of 
the number of guidance documents to the number of legislative rules is-
sued from 1996 to 2006 for five representative agencies: the EPA, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC), OSHA, and the Internal Revenue Service.280  While a 
more precise test of self-insulation would compare the number of 
guidance documents to the number of submitted (rather than issued) 
rules,281 this analysis finds that agencies increase the frequency with 
which they issue guidance documents relative to rules during the first three 
years of a presidential administration, with the ratio decreasing after-
wards.282  This finding would be consistent with the self-insulation hy-
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pothesis, since closer and more certain preference alignment with the cur-
rent administration (relative to the next) would decrease the incentive to 
insulate through guidance documents versus rules.  At the same time, how-
ever, the study’s data are limited and the author concludes that non-
strategic factors, such as the agency’s desire to reduce compliance costs 
through greater clarity, may better help to explain the agency’s choice.283  
For these reasons, future work should extend this dataset and continue to 
build upon these valuable empirical efforts. 
2.  Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis Quality. — As expected presi-
dential preferences vary across different administrations, one would also 
expect to see variations in the quality and form of submitted cost-benefit 
analyses.  A simple theory would be that, for a President with an anti-
regulatory stance, an agency would have a greater incentive to provide a 
poorly translated cost-benefit analysis (CBA), since doing so would in-
crease the costs of review, and facilitate self-insulation through obfusca-
tion.284  Conversely, under a pro-regulatory administration, a higher-quality 
CBA might become a more attractive instrument, since the probability of 
reversal would generally be lower, leading the executive agency to worry 
less about presidential review than judicial review (an exogenous factor 
which would encourage the submission of better CBAs, as later dis-
cussed).285 
Shedding possible light upon this prediction, Robert Hahn and Patrick 
Dudley’s study scores the cost-benefit analysis quality of seventy-four 
economically significant EPA rules published from 1982 to 1999: twenty-
seven from the Reagan administration, twenty-four from the George H. W. 
Bush Administration, and twenty-three from the Clinton Administration.286  
More specifically, they examine various indicia of quality such as whether 
the analysis includes estimates of monetized costs and benefits and a con-
sideration of alternatives, along with the overall clarity of presentation and 
the specification of analytical assumptions.287  While their overall conclu-
sion is that there is “no clear trend in the quality of benefit-cost analysis 
across administrations,”288 a look at some of the disaggregated factors may 
help to reveal more specific avenues of self-insulation. 
For example, Hahn and Dudley examine whether the analyses contain a 
point estimate or a range for total expected costs.289  A point estimate is 
presented as a single number, while a range estimate includes two points 
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bounding a significant portion of the confidence interval.  Both sets of data 
give political principals important information about key components of 
the expected impacts of a regulation.290  The authors find that, under the 
Reagan Administration, 15 percent of the cost-benefit analyses provided 
neither a point estimate nor a range for total costs.291  This figure was 17 
percent during the Bush Administration, dropping down to 4 percent under 
President Clinton.292  In other words, during Republican administrations, 
the EPA was more likely to provide a CBA that contained less useful in-
formation about costs than during a Democratic administration.  Given that 
the traditionally pro-regulatory EPA’s preferences were likely to diverge 
from those of the more anti-regulatory Republican Presidents, one hypoth-
esis is that the EPA was more likely to engage in self-insulation by de-
creasing CBA quality.  Conversely, when there was more expected prefer-
ence alignment under President Clinton, this self-insulating behavior was 
less likely to occur, resulting in higher-quality CBAs.293 
In a more recent paper, Stuart Shapiro and John Morrall examine a da-
tabase of 109 economically significant rules issued between 2000 and 
2009.  They construct a six-point quality index for the accompanying CBA 
based on a number of factors related to the analyses’ “thoroughness.”294  
Upon comparing the quality scores with the net benefits of the rules, they 
observe that “rules that most barely clear the net benefit threshold had the 
least useful analyses supporting them.”295  Shapiro and Morrall hypothe-
size that one explanation for this result could be that “for rules that are 
close to this threshold, agencies may be under pressure to make sure the 
analysis shows positive net benefits.  This pressure may result in a less 
thorough” analysis.296  In other words, “having low net benefits leads to 
analysis that omits critical factors.”297  Assuming that Presidents would be 
more likely to reject rules with small relative to large net benefits, this 
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finding would be consistent with the notion that agencies attempt to self-
insulate by decreasing the quality of CBAs for rules with low net benefits. 
However, Shapiro and Morrall also find that average CBA quality was 
greater for rules with negative net benefits than rules with positive net 
benefits below $1 billion.298  This finding would not support the self-
insulation hypothesis since agencies would presumably seek to shield those 
rules.  More research would thus be necessary to determine whether other 
explanatory factors, such as exogenous statutory constraints299 or a higher 
likelihood of litigation for negative net-benefit rules, may have created a 
cross-cutting incentive to improve CBA quality in anticipation of judicial 
review.300  If not, then this finding would counsel in favor of rejecting the 
self-insulation theory, or at least concluding that it is not the dominant ef-
fect. 
Note that one difficulty with this line of research in general is that 
simply scoring an agency’s published CBA would not allow one to disen-
tangle how much of its quality reflects agency self-insulation at the point 
of submission, and how much of it reflects presidential reviewers’ differen-
tial efforts to spend resources in an attempt to improve its quality.  In other 
words, while agency self-insulation refers to the supply of CBA, there may 
be important countervailing considerations on the demand side as well, 
which will be reflected in the eventually published analysis.301  To illus-
trate, consider another recent study, which scores the CBA of economically 
significant regulations in 2008, 2009, and 2010.  The authors find, among 
other things, that “conservative agencies” had higher-quality CBAs under 
the Obama Administration, while more “liberal agencies” exhibited the 
same tendency under Bush.302 
While the paper uses only three years of data, thus limiting the general-
ity of its conclusions, these findings on their face contradict the notion that 
self-insulation by itself explains the relevant variation, since one would 
expect exactly the opposite dynamic.  The authors explain their results by 
reference to the differential demands likely during presidential review.  In 
their words: 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 298 See id. at 197 tbl 2.  More specifically, they find that rules with negative net benefits had an aver-
age quality score of 3.95 out of a possible 6; those with net benefits between $0 and $100 million had a 
score of 3.03; rules with net benefits between $100 million and $1 billion had a score of 3.79; finally, 
rules with net benefits over $1 billion had an average score of 4.04.  Id. 
 299 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 26 & n.89) (citing the “‘positive train control’ rule, 
which requires certain technology to be placed on trains” and explaining that “even if the rule does not 
have net benefits . . . agencies may have plausible explanations,” such as that “the law requires them to 
proceed even if the monetized benefits are lower than the monetized costs”). 
 300 See infra Part II.C, and accompanying notes.   
   301  See Acs & Cameron, supra note 24, at 22–28.  
 302 See Jerry Ellig, Patrick A. McLaughlin & John F. Morrall III, Continuity, Change, and Priorities  
The Quality and Use of Regulatory Analysis Across US Administrations, REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 14 
(2012), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01149.x/abstract.   
  
 AGENCY SELF-INSULATION 53 
This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that an administration   
demands less thorough analysis from agencies whose underlying policy 
views are more congruent with the administration’s.  Conversely, an 
agency whose policy preferences differ from the administration’s must 
produce better analysis to get its regulations through.303 
 
This dynamic is indeed a critical one, though it is important to remember 
that agencies often have more control over CBA quality as the first-mover, 
nor the limited time and resources available for review.   
 In any case, because of these potential demand-side dynamics, the best 
measure for testing the self-insulation theory would be the CBA quality 
when the analyses were submitted to OIRA, as opposed to after they had 
undergone presidential review and been published.  This evaluation would 
be possible if agencies released their submission drafts or specified the 
changes made as a result of presidential review, as required by current ex-
ecutive orders; however, this is not frequently done as a matter of prac-
tice.304  Confronted with this paucity of data, it could be a plausible as-
sumption — assuming resources were relatively fixed throughout the 
relevant period — that the substance of the review remained fairly system-
atic, and that the overall quality of the published CBA could thus serve as 
a rough proxy for agency effort.  But this assumption may ultimately prove 
heroic, perhaps counseling for changes in agency disclosure practices. 
3.  Strategic Timing. — Finally, as expected presidential preferences 
vary across different administrations, one would also expect to see varia-
tions in the degree to which agencies exploit statutory or judicial deadlines 
in attempts to truncate the amount of review time.  Specifically, as agen-
cies expect a greater probability of reversal, they would be more likely to 
submit rules closer to external deadlines, effectively allowing less review 
time than the default ninety days provided by executive order.  Recent em-
pirical work provides some support for these predicted dynamics.  One 
such study, for instance, examines all economically significant regulations 
proposed in 2008 and finds that statutory deadlines led to considerably 
shorter presidential review times.305  The magnitude of diminished review 
was substantial, ranging from thirty-eight percent to ninety percent less re-
view time.306  In line with these findings, the paper also reports that statu-
tory deadlines result in lower quality CBA as well.  After scoring such 
analyses, the authors find that regulations with statutory deadlines had a 
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mean quality value of 22.1 points versus 27.3 points for the entire sam-
ple.307 
On the one hand, these findings suggest that agencies faced with statu-
tory deadlines are likely to allow less time for review based on when they 
submit their rules to OIRA.  They also suggest that the quality of the cost-
benefit analysis suffers as a result.  Even if the deadline extends beyond 
the review window, it reduces the threat that OIRA could return the regula-
tion because the agency is legislatively or judicially mandated to issue it.  
In this manner, “statutory deadlines could undermine the prospects for ef-
fective OIRA review.”308  On the other hand, a competing explanation 
could be that agencies operating under tight deadlines are working as fast 
as possible and submit their rules without allowing the full ninety days for 
review out of necessity, rather than strategically.  The answer is ultimately 
an empirical question with the expected incentive to self-insulate becoming 
greater as the prospect of preference divergence becomes more likely.309 
C.  Mitigating Factors 
Agency self-insulation consists of agencies’ strategic choices amidst re-
source constraints to raise reviewing costs in the face of expected prefer-
ence divergence.  Identifying and exploring this phenomenon has been the 
main task of this Article.  To provide a more complete account, however, 
this section now considers some potential mitigating factors, that is, some 
dynamics that may cut against the observable effects of self-insulation.310  
In other words, what other variables are likely to influence agency behav-
ior that may reduce the incentive to self-insulate? 
First, while the review process itself is costly and threatens costly re-
versals, agencies may also perceive benefits to it that will decrease their 
insulation incentive.  Such benefits could include obtaining greater infor-
mation and expertise from other executive branch entities311 as well as po-
litical support from a White House eager to “showcase and advance presi-
dential policies.”312  Indeed, one way to think about presidential review is 
as a kind of ninety-day executive branch notice-and-comment process.  As 
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previously discussed, once an agency submits a draft rule to OIRA, the 
OIRA desk officer then circulates the draft to other agencies and White 
House offices that she perceives may have a stake in or expertise related to 
the rule.  OIRA then compiles the comments that it receives from these re-
viewers for the agency’s consideration and response.  The agency’s re-
sponse is then sent back to the reviewers and after several rounds (or how-
ever many rounds time allows for) the issues are slowly resolved and 
whittled down through calls, memos, or meetings. 
In this sense, the process helps to foster an “interagency dialogue” and 
to identify those issues potentially worthy of elevation to higher-level offi-
cials.313  Accordingly, it can serve as a useful information-forcing mecha-
nism for agencies from various executive branch vantage points on a varie-
ty of substantive issues; it can also help agencies anticipate the procedural 
and legal issues likely to arise during a proposed rule’s notice-and-
comment process or in litigation over a final rule.314  The process is also 
beneficial to agencies for receiving “cover” for their initiatives and White 
House support for dealing with the agencies’ constituencies and critics.  
Undergoing review can similarly help agencies consider various political 
sensitivities and prepare for reactions from outside groups.315 
Furthermore, the review process can also be valuable for improving the 
quality of an agency’s CBA either through technical assistance or in help-
ing to consider various alternatives.  Indeed, Clinton’s executive order ex-
plicitly characterizes OIRA as a “repository of expertise concerning regula-
tory issues,”316 and charges it with providing “meaningful guidance and 
oversight.”317  Numerous judicial developments have likely augmented this 
incentive, the most important of which is the D.C. Circuit’s formulation of 
“hard look” review, which was eventually adopted by the Supreme Court 
in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. State Farm.318  According to the 
State Farm Court, “the agency must examine the relevant data and articu-
late a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connec-
tion between the facts found and the choice made.’”319  Though rule-
makings survive hard-look review more often than not,320 courts have 
sometimes found agency cost-benefit analyses lacking under the stand-
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ard.321  The judicial development of “cost-benefit default principles” has 
only reinforced these dynamics.322  These analyses can be improved and 
vetted through a robust presidential-review process, thereby potentially de-
creasing the incentives for self-insulation — particularly for those rules 
that the agency expects to be challenged in court.  
A final factor likely to inform the agency’s choice to self-insulate will 
be the amount of discretion available under the statute to engage in the 
regulatory action in the first place.  Rules can result from statutory re-
quirements that impose affirmative duties on agencies to enact a regula-
tion, or they can arise from other sources, such as “issues identified 
through external sources (for example, public hearings or petitions from 
the regulated community) or internal sources (for example, management 
agendas).”323  That is, rules can be required or simply authorized by rele-
vant legislation; they can be non-discretionary or discretionary.  Nondiscre-
tionary regulatory actions present situations where the agency’s preferences 
will be more closely aligned with those of the President for the simple rea-
son that both actors are constrained by statute.  Under these circumstances, 
an agency’s incentives to self-insulate will be lower.  On the other hand, 
discretionary regulations are much more likely to face resistance from the 
President if preferences diverge; thus, the incentive to insulate is higher. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
A.  President 
From the President’s perspective, agency self-insulation is disconcert-
ing because many of the strategies, such as preventing significance deter-
minations or obfuscating costs, serve only to exacerbate the information 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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asymmetries that presidential review seeks to mitigate in the first place.  
Self-insulation also undermines the potential for robust interagency delib-
eration about the technical effects of a rule.324  Moreover, instruments to 
bypass review can impose consequences that conflict with the presidential 
agenda.  Instruments to calibrate scrutiny can undermine the public legiti-
macy of cost-benefit analysis.  Timing strategies and coalition-building at-
tempts only exacerbate the potential for adversarial antagonism.  Accord-
ingly, this section now briefly turns to the other half of the game, so to 
speak, and considers some of the possible presidential responses and strat-
egies to deal with the phenomenon. 
Specifically, it will focus as a prescriptive matter on some of the insti-
tutional ways that Presidents might attempt to reduce agency self-
insulation, many of which already occur in practice as the need arises.  
This perspective continues a broader historical dynamic between the im-
pulses of agency self-insulation and executive branch control.  As agencies 
have learned to adapt to and manage each new development to serve their 
own aims, Presidents have adopted incremental innovations in response —  
for example, through efforts to increase the scope of review,325 to bundle 
rules together to prevent rule-splitting,326 or to require information earlier 
in the review process.327  Executive orders and other forms of oversight 
are followed by agency adaptation, which then spurs novel presidential re-
sponses, giving way yet again to new executive orders and guidance doc-
uments, and so on. 
At the same time, note that the President’s interest in minimizing self-
insulation is itself constrained.  Even with full information, the President 
will not always seek to maximize control at all times and, indeed, may 
sometimes find it beneficial not to do so.328  Because the review process is 
costly and his resources similarly constrained, the President must be selec-
tive about which regulations to review and how much time to spend re-
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viewing them.329  His limited interest may arise from a judgment that 
spending resources reviewing a particular rule would be wasteful given 
clear signals that reversal would be highly unlikely.  Or it may be due to a 
desire to seek distance from rules that are politically unpopular, but are 
nevertheless required by statute.  Finally, a credible promise to engage in 
limited review can also be a valuable carrot when bargaining over some 
policy choice, either for current or future regulatory actions. 
 
1.  Minimizing Self-Insulation Incentives. — In situations where agency 
slack is undesirable and arises from imperfect information, however, the 
President could work to reduce the incentives to self-insulate in the first 
place.  Because agencies’ incentives to self-insulate increase (1) as their 
perceived preferences diverge from the President and (2) as the independ-
ent benefits of review decrease, it is useful to think of both situations in 
turn. 
First, the discussion so far has largely assumed that agencies have 
some access to information about presidential reviewers and can thus pre-
dict the likelihood of agreement.  Indeed, they may rely on a number of 
proxies such as party affiliation, campaign promises, as well as their own 
informal contacts to predict likely review outcomes.  That said, however, 
the current structure of presidential review can also encourage a fair 
amount of uncertainty until the review process formally begins, particular-
ly for those rules that are not high-profile enough to merit informal discus-
sion.330  Because agencies can spend months or years conducting research 
and outreach before drafting a proposed rule, they can sometimes be 
caught flat-footed during review, hearing then for the first time concerns 
raised by the White House and other agencies.331 
Even in cases when their preferences may not actually diverge, uncer-
tainty can increase the incentive for agencies to self-insulate from presi-
dential review.  The higher the decision costs, the more costly a possible 
reversal, so insulation will increasingly become the safer strategy.332  
When insulation occurs under these circumstances, the outcome is ineffi-
cient in the sense that both parties may have chosen other outcomes had 
full information been available.  While mechanisms to increase the amount 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 329 For one positive theory and analysis, see Acs & Cameron, supra note 24, at 22–28 (modeling 
targeting decision as an auditing game). 
 330 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 12) (“For relatively less important rules, and those 
that do not implicate the interests or concerns of other parts of the government, agencies might engage 
in no interagency consultation in advance of the OIRA process.”). 
 331 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 94, at 171–74 (discussing hypothetical but realistic EPA Phlogiston 
rule and observing that in the 18 months before EPA submitted the draft to OMB, “[t]here had been no 
contact between the EPA staff responsible for drafting the rule and the OMB staff responsible for re-
viewing it,” id. at 173). 
 332 Conversely, when decision costs are low, agencies may be less likely to self-insulate given the 
potential benefits of review. 
  
 AGENCY SELF-INSULATION 59 
of earlier information already exist by executive order, however, they are 
not currently used robustly in practice.  For example, President Clinton’s 
executive order establishes a Regulatory Working Group, consisting of 
“representatives of the heads of each agency” with “significant domestic 
regulatory responsibility, the Advisors, and the Vice President.”333  Its in-
tended purpose was to “serve as a forum to assist agencies in identifying 
and analyzing important regulatory issues” and was directed to meet “at 
least quarterly.”334  At least under President George W. Bush, however, the 
group was “no longer a functioning entity,”335 and currently meets only 
sporadically. 
Similarly, the executive order provides for various early planning 
mechanisms such as “agencies’ policy meeting[s]” held by the Vice Presi-
dent with the “Advisors and the heads of agencies to seek a common un-
derstanding of priorities,” as well as the Unified Regulatory Agenda and 
Plan.336  But their practical utility for the purposes of increasing the 
amount of available information has been, by all accounts, limited,337 with 
one former OIRA Administrator opining that the regulatory agenda “pro-
cess itself has become more of a paper exercise than an analytical tool.  
This is not new; before, during, and after my tenure at OIRA the focus was 
on the transactions.”338 
Despite their authorization by executive order, what might explain the 
decline in the use of such mechanisms that, on their face, could provide a 
rich source of information to principals and agencies alike?  The analysis 
thus far suggests a few answers.  The simplest (but perhaps the least inter-
esting) is that agencies lack the resources to devote to front-end planning 
and coordination and/or OIRA lacks the resources to enforce them.  On 
this account, as the resources of agencies decrease, they would have a 
greater incentive to self-insulate since their decision costs are now effec-
tively higher.  Similarly, as OIRA resources decrease, agencies will be 
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more successful in insulating, since OIRA’s reviewing costs have now be-
come effectively higher.  Indeed, the trend over the last fifty years has 
been a steady increase in regulatory agency resources, alongside a decline 
in those of OIRA.339  As a result, OIRA has likely shifted resources to-
wards transactional, back-end regulatory review, and away from other ear-
ly-stage coordination mechanisms. 
Another possibility is that none of these planning mechanisms provides 
the fine-grained kind of information necessary to serve as an effective tool 
of presidential control given the potential diversity of issues in any single 
rule.  As a result, the President has seen no reason to enforce and use these 
planning mechanisms, exploring instead innovations designed to increase 
the amount of review time for specific rules in response to strategic timing, 
as well as to enhance the benefits of review (and thus decrease the incen-
tive for self-insulation).  In support of this hypothesis is the development 
of a practice known as “informal review.”340  Informal review simply 
means that agencies share preliminary drafts of rules or cost-benefit anal-
yses informally with OIRA in order to receive early input and feedback; 
sometimes this early review can be initiated by a White House policy of-
fice.341  According to a 2001 annual OIRA congressional report, “[t]his 
practice is useful for agencies since they have the opportunity to educate 
OIRA desk officers in a more patient way, before the formal 90-day review 
clock at OIRA begins to tick.”342  It is “also useful for OIRA analysts” and 
other interagency reviewers “because they have an opportunity to flag se-
rious problems early enough to facilitate correction before the agency’s po-
sition is irreversible.”343  
In light of this Article’s analysis, one would expect that the rules that 
are most attractive to the agency for informal review are those where the 
benefits of review — say, due to the need for interagency coordination and 
information-sharing, political sensitivities, or a particularly complicated 
cost-benefit analysis — are high, the expectations of reversal are lower, 
and/or divergent preferences are uncertain but can be narrowed through 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 339 See SUSAN DUDLEY & MELINDA WARREN, WEIDENBAUM CTR. ON THE ECON., GOV’T & 
PUB. POLICY & THE GEORGE WASH. UNIV. REGULATORY STUDIES CTR., GROWTH IN REGULA-
TORS’ BUDGET SLOWED BY FISCAL STALEMATE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. BUDGET FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2012 AND 2013, at 9–12 (2012); Andrew Zajac, As Number of Regulators Rise, Their Overse-
er’s Staff Shrinks, WASH. POST, June 24, 2012, at A14, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/regulators-surge-in-numbers-while-overseers-
shrink/2012/06/24/gJQArWvD0V_story.html; GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 60 
fig.8 (showing general trend in 20-year decline in OIRA staffing resources from 90 full-time staff in 
1981 to 55 in 2003, though showing a small increase from 47 staffers in 2000). 
 340 GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 36–38. 
 341 Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 12). 
 342 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: 2001 REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, 
LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 43 (2001). 
 343 Id. 
  
 AGENCY SELF-INSULATION 61 
earlier engagement.  One example of such a rule comes from the Clinton 
Administration under which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
asked to brief OIRA informally on a likely-to-be-economically-significant 
proposed seafood safety regulation.  As the then-OIRA Administrator re-
calls the events: 
As the meeting went on (and on), the OIRA staff became increasingly 
skeptical of the approach being pursued and began suggesting alternative 
ways to achieve the FDA’s objectives.  The FDA staff left without any 
commitments to follow up, but then they did.  They worked with the OIRA 
staff, and when the final seafood Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point 
rule ultimately emerged, it was praised by all the stakeholders and an offi-
cial at FDA called to read me the headline from an editorial in a newspa-
per from the Northwest calling it a ‘sensible regulation.’344 
Along similar lines, a Congressional Research Service study reports 
that informal review is “most common . . . when the rule is extremely 
large and requires discussion with not only OMB but also other federal 
agencies.”345 
Of course, the executive branch cannot informally review each of the 
hundreds of significant proposed and final rules submitted to OIRA each 
year, but the value of informal review to all parties may be another reason 
to suggest the need for Congress to consider increasing OIRA resources.  
Alternatively, OIRA might also consider more formally acknowledging and 
encouraging informal review for those rules that the agency already knows 
will be costly or politically sensitive, something that OIRA seems to have 
considered in the past.346 
2.  Decreasing Preference Divergence. — In addition to reducing uncer-
tainty through earlier engagement, the President can minimize self-
insulation by decreasing known preference divergence before the formal 
review process begins.  One way to do so is to expand the use of “innova-
tive techniques” that Presidents have used in the past to “impress [their] 
own regulatory views on the administrative agencies.”347  While these 
tools have often been characterized as mechanisms of control, another way 
to conceive of them is as tools to increase certainty about areas of potential 
preference alignment.  These techniques include the issuance of presiden-
tial directives, statements, and memoranda to executive branch agency 
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heads, “instructing them to take specified action within the scope of the 
discretionary power delegated to them by Congress.”348  These kinds of 
directives allow the President to communicate his preferences up front and 
to instigate agency actions, rather than merely review them. 
In light of agencies’ incentives to self-insulate by avoiding significance 
determinations, another mechanism the President could use in response 
would be to perform randomized spot checks.  As discussed, agencies ini-
tially signal such determinations in their regulatory agendas or during list-
ing exercises.349  OIRA could draw a random sample from all rules not 
designated as “significant” or “economically significant” for closer review, 
and request further information as warranted.  These spot checks would 
require that the agency provide some initial estimates of the costs and ben-
efits, to the extent feasible, as well as a reasoned explanation of why the 
rule does not meet any of the significance criteria.350 
To illustrate, take the story of the former OIRA Administrator who first 
learned from the pages of the Washington Post about a proposed rule to 
require labeling of particular kinds of meat and poultry.  From the newspa-
per account, it was clear that the regulation was likely to have an economic 
impact of far greater than $100 million.  A dispute ensued, in which OIRA 
informed the Department of Agriculture that it could either withdraw the 
rule or send a draft for review.  The Department promptly chose to send a 
draft to OIRA.351  This is an example of what effectively amounted to a 
spot check, which have helped to catch the rule before it was proposed, as-
suming that it had been listed elsewhere. 
The likely objection from agencies, however, would be that they have 
neither sufficient information to provide to OIRA at the agenda or listing 
stage nor the necessary resources to gather it.  As such, a more effective, 
but also more costly strategy would be for OIRA to invite external spot 
checks on the regulatory agenda as a whole and to have a regular process 
for reviewing them.  OIRA could specifically request that commenters 
contest any of the priority designations, and that they provide any available 
data pertaining to the potential rule’s impacts.  Of course, this effort would 
depend on the expansion of OIRA’s already limited resource constraints. 
3.  Reducing Internal Review Costs. — In the absence of additional re-
sources, another set of presidential strategies would entail effectively re-
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ducing reviewing costs by providing guidance to agencies designed to fa-
cilitate review, particularly for non-OIRA presidential reviewers such as 
other agencies or White House offices.  The issuance in 2003 of Circular 
A-4, which “provides . . . guidance to Federal agencies on the develop-
ment of regulatory analysis,” may be understood in this light.352  So too 
for OIRA’s recent issuance of a checklist, primer, and frequently-asked-
questions for regulatory impact analysis, effectively a suite of tools to low-
er reviewing costs.353  Indeed, Cass Sunstein writes that “[a]ll of these 
documents are designed to promote simplicity and clarity for agencies and 
the public alike . . . .”354  The same intuition would apply to presidential 
reviewers as well. 
A similar rationale would also hold for OIRA’s recent guidance docu-
ment stating that “regulatory preambles for lengthy or complex rules (both 
proposed and final) should include straightforward executive summaries” 
that “separately describe major provisions and policy choices.”355  These 
changes, if implemented, would help reduce the amount of time spent dur-
ing review attempting to clarify various provisions with the agency, thus 
allowing more resources to be devoted to resolving any underlying policy 
disagreements. 
4.  Timing Regulation Strategies. — Finally, from the perspective of the 
President, strategic timing by agencies changes the cost structure for re-
viewers, disrupting other procedures and forces that exist to help prioritize 
the attention given to a regulation.  In other words, “strategic timing is a 
form of subterfuge that reduces the otherwise existing forces that calibrate 
the extent of monitoring to the importance of the decision.”356  One strate-
gy to mitigate this possibility would be to adopt formally what Professors 
Jacob Gersen and Anne O’Connell have called a “coordination rule,” the 
purpose of which would be to give agencies and reviewers alike notice 
about the need to shift priorities ex ante to the most salient forthcoming 
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regulatory actions in order to allow sufficient time for review.357  This type 
of coordination device could prescribe, for example, a specific time period 
for review, set and agreed upon by both parties in advance — for example, 
as soon as the legal or statutory deadline was promulgated. 
This strategy could be implemented simply as a matter of practice and 
mutual agreement between particular agencies and OIRA.  A more formal 
adoption may require revision to the existing executive orders, which cur-
rently require agencies to notify OIRA of any statutory or judicial dead-
lines and, “to the extent practicable, schedule rulemaking proceedings so 
as to permit sufficient time for OIRA to conduct its review as set forth” in 
the order, that is, the 90-day default rule.358  One blunt way to attempt to 
better enforce this 90-day coordination rule would be simply to delete the 
language, “to the extent practicable.”  However, to address the likely and 
legitimate agency response that many deadlines do not allow sufficient 
time to prepare and submit a rule ninety days before the deadline, a more 
realistic strategy may be the tailored one: to mutually adopt an early re-
view period for particular rules during which OIRA could begin to review 
parts of the rule as they become available (for example, the agency could 
provide the regulatory impact analysis) — a practice that already occurs 
under informal review.  Some have also suggested a more formal early re-
view process for rules with expected annual benefits or costs of over $1 
billion.359  More generally, an agency and OIRA could also agree on other 
review period lengths that are fixed ex ante, calibrated either to the per-
ceived importance of the rule, or some proportion of the time granted by 
Congress to the agency to promulgate the rule. 
B.  Courts 
In light of the incentives for agency self-insulation and the available 
presidential responses for minimizing them, what are some implications of 
these dynamics, if any, for the courts?  As an initial matter, how one thinks 
this question is best answered will likely track what one thinks about the 
general merits of presidential control underlying many of the constitutional 
and statutory debates about its proper scope.360  If one believes that the 
presidential control model has been a valuable, even necessary, develop-
ment for legitimizing the administrative state, then agency self-insulation is 
cause for concern, and courts should act to minimize it.  Here, supporters 
often cite the President’s electoral accountability and national constituency 
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as reasons to check agency over-zealousness and capture.361  Only the 
President, they argue, has the bird’s-eye view necessary to coordinate and 
harmonize agency efforts; he is also the best situated to respond dynami-
cally to changed circumstances.362 
On the other hand, if one believes that presidential review is illegiti-
mate, then self-insulation is cause for celebration, and courts should seek 
to encourage it.  In this view, that executive branch agencies can fend for 
themselves helps to alleviate an otherwise worrisome state of affairs.  The 
risk of capture, these critics argue, is equally likely for EOP entities and 
presidential review is unduly shrouded in secrecy.363  Agencies are more 
expert relative to the White House in fulfilling their statutory missions,364 
particularly for issues with longer time horizons.365 
There is, however, a likely and necessary middle ground between these 
two camps at their most extreme, that is, between those who believe that 
presidential involvement is always legitimate, even necessary, and those 
who believe it is never so except in the narrowest of circumstances.  As a 
practical matter, Presidents have sought to influence their agency heads 
through ad hoc and informal means for centuries, with interventions only 
becoming increasingly institutionalized through formal review in the last 
three decades.366  Against this backdrop, one relevant question is how and 
when such involvement can be made legitimately transparent such that 
other institutions like courts and Congress can serve as effective checks, 
when necessary.367  To the extent that transparency provides some common 
ground, such a position recognizes that presidential review is often con-
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structive and valuable — allowing, say, for greater information-sharing, the 
benefit of interagency expertise,368 and oversight to prevent unnecessarily 
conflicting policies.369  At other times, however, it may be unambiguously 
inappropriate, for example, if a President directs an agency head to conceal 
or fabricate scientific data in support of some outcome. 
Between these poles are a host of possible interventions, whose legiti-
macy will depend on their specific nature and the features of the underly-
ing authorizing statutes.  Normative determinations about presidential re-
view (and by extension, agency self-insulation from it) must thus 
necessarily be case-by-case, evaluated against specific statutory and factual 
circumstances.  In some situations, under particular administrations, such 
interventions will be substantively constructive and beneficial, while in 
others, less so.  Accordingly, the soundest prescriptions should ask, as an 
initial step, how to reveal presidential involvement in order to facilitate in-
dividual judgments that are assessed against Congress’ demands. 
1.  Self-Insulation as an Undue Politicization Signal. — Despite provi-
sions under current executive orders for agencies and OIRA to disclose the 
changes made as a result of the presidential review process,370 such disclo-
sures are not regularly made in practice, leading some to suggest more 
forceful statutory disclosure requirements.371  Until such changes occur, 
courts will have to rely on various second-best signals or heuristics, like 
indicia of agency self-insulation, to evaluate the nature of presidential in-
volvement.  Thus, for example, when courts observe signs of self-
insulation, such as abrupt shifts in policymaking form, poor-quality CBA, 
or truncated presidential review time, then such efforts, taken together, 
could reflect signs of resistance or “danger signals”372 that invite greater 
judicial scrutiny under hard look or Chevron’s Step Two reasonableness 
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review.373  Such signals would, of course, need to be understood within 
their broader context, an inquiry that would benefit from future empirical 
work as to whether agencies systematically self-insulate and the conditions 
under which they are most likely to do so. 
Whether agency self-insulation is a salutary or subversive phenomenon, 
in turn, will ultimately depend on the particular reason for the agency’s 
expected preference divergence with the President, and whether that reason 
is sanctioned by statute.  For example, in cases that reflect an agency’s ef-
forts to protect from interference technical judgments grounded in a statute 
narrowly constraining policy discretion, indicia of self-insulation could 
serve as signals of undue politicization meriting greater scrutiny.374  In-
deed, familiar administrative law principles provide that agencies can act 
only under legislative delegations of authority, must remain within the con-
fines of that authority, and may take into account only those factors set out 
by Congress.  Under hard-look review, for example, the State Farm Court 
provided that agencies must consider “relevant factors” but not those “fac-
tors which Congress has not intended it to consider.”375  As for Chevron’s 
second step, one way to understand the analogous question is whether stat-
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utory ambiguity on a decisional factor permits an interpretation allowing 
consideration of that factor.376 
Under either doctrinal inquiry, courts should inquire as to whether the 
statute evinces a legislative intent to restrict certain forms of policy dis-
cretion of the kind more likely to be elevated to higher-level policy offi-
cials during presidential review, including questions of flexibility, timing, 
and cost-benefit tradeoffs.377  One way to understand this task would be to 
consider which actors within an agency or the executive branch — whether 
career staff, experts,  White House policy officials, and so on — Congress 
would have wanted allocated the decisionmaking power under particular 
statutory schemes, and to evaluate the likelihood that those actors were af-
forded that power, given signals of agency self-insulation.378  When the 
relevant statute can be interpreted to narrowly limit as the basis of deci-
sionmaking discretionary factors more likely to be associated with raw 
presidential preferences, then self-insulation is more likely to be merited as 
agency attempts to protect its relative expertise.379  In this manner, courts 
can serve a narrow boundary-enforcing role against the possibility of exec-
utive overreach, and indicia of self-insulation would be but signals to alert 
the need for this inquiry.380 
Conversely, when the underlying statute allows for broad discretionary 
factors of the kind likely to be considered during presidential review, then 
self-insulation is more likely to be inappropriate, for it now constitutes ef-
forts to unjustifiably avoid the interest-balancing that underlies presidential 
accountability.  In this manner, courts should first determine the extent to 
which the statute at issue attempts to prohibit or allows for discretionary 
policy judgments, and then treat agency self-insulation accordingly.  While 
this analysis is unlikely to admit of bright lines given the diversity of statu-
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tory schemes and the potential for overlap between the categories of expert 
and political judgments, the analytic distinctions may nevertheless be use-
ful as courts apply them case-by-case.  These judgments may well draw 
upon familiar tools of statutory construction, the identity of the statutory 
delegate, or the structure of the agency at issue,381 but as a general matter, 
this functional approach would seek to facilitate separation-of-powers prin-
ciples within the executive branch.382 
To illustrate, consider some statutory provisions which courts have in-
terpreted to prohibit certain policy factors particularly likely to be salient 
to the President, such as the consideration of economic costs.  For exam-
ple, the Tennessee Valley Authority Court examined a statute requiring fed-
eral agencies “‘to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by 
them do not jeopardize the continued existence’ of an endangered spe-
cies.”383  It held that the provision prohibited flexibility, what it called “fi-
ne utilitarian calculations,”384 and thereby halted the completion of a dam 
in which millions of dollars had already been invested.385   
Similarly, in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.,386 the 
Court held that a provision requiring air pollution standards to be set at a 
level “requisite to protect the public health” with an “adequate margin of 
safety,”387 did not allow costs to be taken into account when standard-
setting; it therefore rejected a contrary EPA interpretation under Chevron’s 
second step.388  Courts would likely reach similar cost-prohibiting conclu-
sions under statutes that call for, say, mandating “practicable” standards 
“permitting no discharge of pollutants,”389 or decisions based on the “best 
science,” or otherwise specifying more resolutely technical and expertise-
based decisional criteria.390 
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By contrast, in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,391 the Court held 
that a Clean Water Act provision calling for the “best technology available 
for minimizing adverse environmental impact” allowed the EPA to balance 
costs and benefits.392  Here, the majority read Congress’s silence about the 
propriety of considering “cost,” relative to other statutory provisions in the 
Act, to mean that the EPA could consider it as a decisional factor, and 
therefore upheld the agency action under Chevron’s reasonableness in-
quiry.393  Read broadly, this approach resonates with a number of D.C. 
Circuit cases holding that when Congress is silent with respect to a logical-
ly relevant factor under hard look review, then that silence should be read 
to permit the agency to consider the factor.394  More narrowly, this pre-
sumption operated in the specific context of the text and structure of the 
Clean Water Act and was thus an ordinary exercise in statutory interpreta-
tion, as opposed to a broader cost-benefit default rule.  Courts should con-
tinue to examine the extent to which specific statutes allow agencies to 
consider particular policy factors, if at all, before assessing self-insulation 
signals accordingly. 
As for how courts would evaluate agency self-insulation after undertak-
ing such an inquiry, Massachusetts v. EPA395 may help to illustrate.  There, 
a bare majority held that the EPA had failed to provide an adequate ra-
tionale for its denial of a rulemaking petition filed by a number of states 
and private plaintiffs to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new mo-
tor vehicles.396  Under Chevron, the interpretive question was whether 
Congress intended for carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to be 
“air pollutant[s]” under the statute.397  Finding the text “unambiguous” at 
Chevron Step One, the majority held that the EPA indeed possessed the 
statutory authority to regulate them.398  More relevantly for our purposes, 
the agency’s alternative argument was that even if it did possess the requi-
site authority, it could still lawfully exercise its discretion by declining to 
regulate for policy-related reasons commonly considered during presiden-
tial review, such as the executive branch’s desire to coordinate its pro-
grams, to avoid a “piecemeal approach” to climate change, as well as to al-
low the President the necessary flexibility with which to negotiate with 
“key developing nations.”399 
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Rejecting these premises, the Court under hard-look review held that 
such reasoning was “divorced from the statutory text.”400  Specifically, it 
found that while the statute tied such discretion to the EPA’s “judg-
ment,”401 that judgment had to be grounded in whether an air pollutant 
“cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be antic-
ipated to endanger public health or welfare.”402  In other words, the Clean 
Air Act cabined the amount of policy discretion available such that the 
EPA could decline to take further action only upon a technical, expert de-
termination that greenhouse gases did not contribute to climate change, or 
by providing another reasoned explanation as to why it could or would not 
exercise this judgment.403  After finding that the EPA had “offered no rea-
soned explanation for its refusal to decide,” the Court found the EPA’s ac-
tion to be arbitrary and capricious, and remanded accordingly.404 
Shortly after the decision, some argued that the case represented an ef-
fort by the Court to privilege expertise over politics, and referred to the 
“political, cultural, and legal context” as cues that something was amiss 
within the EPA.405  Using the lens of agency self-insulation, one could also 
understand the EPA’s petition denial as yet another signal of its attempt to 
avoid what it knew would be a costly reversal by the Bush Administration, 
which had made its views on climate change clear.  By choosing inaction 
instead of proceeding with a rule, the EPA was engaging in a form of self-
insulation.  Indeed, according to various accounts, the Bush “administra-
tion had been altering scientific reports, silencing its own experts, and sup-
pressing scientific information” suggesting “a significant rise in global 
temperatures and linking the rise to human activity.”406  Thus, the agency 
had every reason to believe that its efforts to initiate a rulemaking would 
be rebuffed by the President. 
Indeed, these fears of reversal were well-founded, as further borne out 
by events following the Court’s decision.  After the EPA prepared what 
was apparently a proposed rule concluding that greenhouse gases  endan-
gered public welfare, reports circulated that “OMB officials [had] told the 
EPA that its email containing the document would not be opened,” leading 
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the EPA to later issue only a weak advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
that offered no endangerment conclusion.407  This choice of policymaking 
form was arguably another act of self-insulation, an abrupt shift from a 
would-be proposed rule to a more tentative advance notice that offered lit-
tle information.   
The document revealed, in an unusually visible manner, the disagree-
ment between the EPA’s political leadership and its career staff about the 
ability to regulate greenhouse gases under existing statutory authorities.408  
While the advance notice itself discussed all the ways in which the EPA 
could successfully do so, it was prefaced by an uncommon statement 
signed by the Administrator stating that such efforts would “inevitably re-
sult in a very complicated, time-consuming and, likely, convoluted set of 
regulations” that would “largely pre-empt or overlay existing programs that 
help control greenhouse gas emissions and would be relatively ineffective 
at reducing greenhouse gas concentrations given the potentially damaging 
effect on jobs and the U.S. economy.”409 
Amidst the Bush Administration’s “censorious posture,” the EPA simp-
ly sat “on a trove of materials — a proposed endangerment finding, a pro-
posal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, a pro-
posed reporting rule for greenhouse gases, [and] a proposal on renewable 
fuel standards.”410  After spending considerable resources preparing them, 
the EPA had decided that near-certain presidential reversal would be more 
costly, and thus chose instead to insulate their rules.  In this manner, such 
behavior can serve as a set of signals about attempts to resist political in-
fluences that are otherwise invisible during other administrative procedures 
that begin after a rule has been presidentially-reviewed, such as notice-
and-comment. 
Of course, not all instances of when an agency, say, chooses a guidance 
document rather than a rule, or submits a rule close to a statutory deadline 
or with a weak CBA, represent attempts to self-insulate.  Sometimes these 
patterns of behavior will not in fact be choices at all, but will reflect in-
stead top-down directions from the White House after a rule has been 
submitted; but these situations too are informative against statutes that de-
mand regulatory action or a reasoned explanation for failing to undertake 
it.  Alternatively, the preference divergence could also be the result of in-
dustry capture of the agency head, which would need to be evaluated by 
reference to the industry in question and the regulating agency.411  Finally, 
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 407 Mendelson, supra note 128, at 1153. 
 408 See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the 
Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44354 (July 30, 2008).   
 409 Id. at 44355. 
 410 Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012). 
 411 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 34, at 71 (describing Consumer Product Safety Commission as one 
of the most captured agencies). 
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self-insulation could also be motivated by resource constraints, and di-
vorced from substantive policy judgments.  Evaluating why self-insulation 
occurs in a particular case will thus necessarily involve a context-specific 
and case-by-case inquiry but should, at a minimum, prompt courts to un-
dertake such an inquiry. 
2.  Monitoring Facilitation. — At the same time, recall that presidential 
review serves as both a kind of political review of issues that the President 
has judged salient to his agenda as well as a form of analytical review of 
the ways in which agencies evaluate costs and benefits, choose among po-
tential alternatives, and consider technical issues, as appropriate.412  While 
these dimensions can be interrelated and difficult to disentangle, these cat-
egories are nevertheless analytically distinct and can help serve as orient-
ing poles.  When agencies attempt to insulate themselves from analytical 
review, then another important role for the courts, likely to appeal to both 
sides of the presidentialist debate, would be to understand courts as moni-
toring facilitators.413  This role would see courts as helping to ensure that 
external political monitors, such as interest groups or Congress, have the 
requisite high-quality information about potential regulatory consequences 
in order to facilitate fire-alarm oversight and the resolution of competing 
interests through overtly political processes.  One way to do so would be 
to encourage the availability of information sources external to the presi-
dential review process, that is, cost-benefit figures or substantive data 
about regulatory impacts that are neither agency-provided nor presidential-
ly reviewed. 
As long as one agrees that agents, such as administrative agencies, 
should implement the goals of their principals — the President, Congress, 
or society more broadly — the dynamics of self-insulation sure to be the 
most troubling are those that mask the effects of agency action.414  Indeed, 
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 412 See Shapiro, supra note 82; Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 30–31). 
 413 This Article’s concept of monitoring facilitation bears a close family resemblance to Eric Pos-
ner’s “signal refinement theory,” which understands the cost-benefit signal’s value as sorting efficient 
projects from inefficient ones.  See Posner, supra note 20, at 1191 (“Courts should try to raise the dif-
ference between the cost of issuing a plausible cost-benefit analysis of an efficient project and the cost 
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 414 The various ways that courts have policed agencies’ strategic use of adjudication or guidance 
documents over rulemaking in efforts to “achieve [their] goal[s] only (or mainly) because of the form 
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this Article has proposed a conception of agencies that choose regulatory 
instruments as distinct bundles of characteristics, some of which make 
presidential review more difficult by limiting the amount and quality of in-
formation about potential impacts (such as the avoidance of rulemaking or 
the manipulation of significance determinations and cost-benefit analyses), 
and some of which simply raise the resource and political costs of presi-
dential reversal (for example, through timing strategies or coalition build-
ing with career staff or other executive branch entities). 
At root, they succeed by blunting the signals that principals ordinarily 
rely upon to assess an action’s potential salience to their agendas and pri-
orities.  For example, when agencies flag regulatory actions as non-
significant, significant, or economically significant, these significance de-
terminations should indicate the action’s potential priority for the Presi-
dent.  Agency assessments of costs and benefits serve a similar function by 
identifying potential regulatory consequences that may be salient to vari-
ous groups or constituencies.  This is true whether they are fully quantified 
or described qualitatively.  In this manner, attempts at strategic self-
insulation are, for the most part, efforts to reduce information-quality.415  
Accordingly, doctrinal developments post-Chevron granting more def-
erence when agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking should be 
understood as constructive efforts to encourage external sources of infor-
mation for the rulemaking record.  In United States v. Mead Corp., for ex-
ample, the Court considered whether to grant Chevron deference to a tariff 
classification ruling by the U.S. Customs Service.  It held that the ruling 
was not eligible for such deference because Chevron applies when Con-
gress has delegated authority “to make rules carrying the force of law,” 
and the agency has acted pursuant to that authority when interpreting the 
statute.416  The Court noted that when Congress provides for a “relatively 
formal administrative procedure” that fosters “fairness and deliberation,” 
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, it is rea-
sonable to presume such legislative intent.417  In the absence of such in-
formation-forcing processes, Barnhart v. Walton418 later provided that def-
erence is potentially due only when, for example, more Skidmore-like 
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[they] chose,” Magill, supra note 3, at 1446, have been adequately and ably discussed elsewhere, see 
id. at 1437–42.  To summarize Elizabeth Magill’s analysis, courts can calibrate their standards of re-
view or otherwise adjudge guidance documents and other agency action as ripe for review, all in at-
tempts to police agencies’ choices of form when they offend the courts’ notions of procedural fairness 
or sound policy development.  Id. at 1438.  
 415 Of course, this premise should not be overstated; there are many other reasons, besides conveying 
information about consequences, that justify agency behavior such as the choice of form.  Agencies 
often choose to pursue adjudication over rulemaking, for example, when they are uncertain about which 
policy to pursue, see id. at 1396–97, or Congress may have dictated the form of regulatory instrument 
for agencies to use or otherwise minimized the discretion available for agency action.  
 416 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 417 See id. at 230. 
 418 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
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considerations of agency expertise are apparent.419  By giving agencies an 
incentive to garner information from the public or through adversarial pro-
cedures, courts have helped to ameliorate the effects of strategic infor-
mation provision under presidential review by soliciting data from inde-
pendent sources. 
Similarly, when the quality of an agency’s cost-benefit analysis is poor 
as a result of an attempt to reduce the scrutiny of presidential review, a 
harder look under arbitrary-and-capricious review may be judicially appro-
priate since there was less initial information for public comment or over-
sight.  Moreover, courts could examine not only the agency’s proffered re-
sponses to public input, but also examine as one factor the source of the 
comments, taking favorable notice when those sources are pluralistic or 
from more neutral, expert bodies such as the National Academy of Scienc-
es.  Giving weight to such factors is more likely to increase the accuracy 
of the information through robust contestation. 
Of course, courts cannot require agencies to undertake any additional 
procedures other than those required by statute.420  Rather, here, they 
would simply give agencies an incentive to invite external evaluations of 
their own work.  Illustrative of this approach, for example, are some courts 
that have taken notice when there are independent evaluations of costs and 
benefits in the record before upholding environmental impact statements as 
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 419 See id. at 221–22.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944), considered an amicus 
brief filed by the Department of Labor’s Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, who had issued 
an “Interpretative Bulletin” containing a standard for calculating working time.  The Court held that 
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used and the nature of the question at issue.”  Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222.  As applied to the case at 
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    In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the 
importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and 
the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time all indicate that 
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tation here at issue.  
  Id. at 222.  As such, Barnhart and Mead clarified that Chevron deference applies to interpreta-
tions with the force of law or promulgated pursuant to formal procedures such as formal adjudication or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, but that other expertise-based factors could warrant deference as well 
— approaches that have been followed, in varying degrees, by the lower courts.  See, e.g., Mylan Labs., 
Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How 
Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1457–74 (2005) (dis-
cussing in detail how lower courts have applied Mead and Barnhart). 
 420 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) 
(holding that section 4 of the Administrative Procedures Act “established the maximum procedural re-
quirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rule-
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reasonable under the National Environmental Policy Act.421  In a related 
vein, courts have also critically viewed agency rejections of expert adviso-
ry committee opinions, especially when those opinions are required by 
statute,422 and conversely regarded careful consideration of concerns raised 
by such committees favorably.423  Similar approaches could further aid the 
hard look inquiry. 
C.  Congress 
To facilitate these doctrinal refinements, Congress could and should al-
so play an important role in fostering independent evaluations of cost-
benefit analyses and improving such analyses’ quality as signals of regula-
tory impact.  The Truth in Regulating Act of 2000,424 for example, tempo-
rarily required the General Accounting Office (GAO) to provide its own 
external evaluations of agencies’ cost-benefit analyses for final rules.425  
However, the provision depended on an additional $5.2 million in GAO’s 
annual appropriations.  The funds were never granted, but could still be in 
the future.426  Alternatively, as Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman suggests, 
an independent body (which she would call the Office for the Review of 
Policy Analytic Techniques) could also be placed within the GAO, Nation-
al Science Foundation, or the National Academy of Sciences.427  By creat-
ing and funding such bodies, Congress could play an important role in 
helping to improve the quality of agency informational signals, thereby 
helping to counter the structural incentives for strategic behavior and agen-
cy self-insulation. 
Ultimately, refining this kind of information would improve the ability 
of external actors to monitor agency behavior and would also reduce the 
risk that such information might be simply dismissed as “cheap talk” and 
discounted in value.428  Indeed, in situations where agents act strategically 
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amidst information asymmetries, the private incentives for information ag-
gregation and revelation are likely to depart from what is desirable from 
the perspective of adequate monitoring by principals (again, whether the 
President, Congress, or society more broadly).429  Independent evaluations 
of the information produced could help to provide the necessary counter-
weight to such dynamics. 
The prospective dynamics of agency self-insulation also highlight a 
number of avenues through which Congress could more effectively insu-
late agencies from the President beyond the formal removal restrictions at 
issue in Free Enterprise Fund, and in recognition of the more functional 
nature of agency independence.430  For starters, recall that, ever since 
Reagan’s executive order, presidential review has covered any “agency” as 
defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA)431 and expressly 
excludes those defined as “independent regulatory agencies” under that 
Act.432  Since 1981, then, Congress has had the ability to circumscribe the 
coverage of presidential review through statutory amendments to the 
PRA.433  Recent provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act — placing 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency on the PRA’s list of “independent regulatory agencies” 
— reflect this strategy.434 
In addition, Congress could dictate specific policymaking forms that 
are more likely, as a class, to bypass presidential review; for example, pro-
hibiting rulemaking would channel policymaking to other forms such as 
guidance documents.435  Congress could also use statutory deadlines to 
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help empower executive agencies against the President, or provide for 
overlapping agency jurisdictions or joint rulemakings that would create 
and foster coalitions among agencies that, together, could provide greater 
resistance to the President.436  Finally, because self-insulation is ultimately 
a resource-centered strategy, Congress’s budgeting decisions for OIRA, the 
Executive Office of the President, and various other executive agencies 
would also help to determine the relative bargaining power within the ex-
ecutive branch. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the literature has given insufficient atten-
tion to the incentives created by presidential review relative to judicial re-
view and has sought to help remedy that imbalance.  The discussion has 
provided a conceptual framework and vocabulary for thinking about stra-
tegic agency behavior in the context of presidential review, illustrated its 
dynamics, and assessed its normative implications.  The analysis yields 
multiple hypotheses for future empirical work. Are there, for example, ob-
servable patterns of self-insulation that differ for certain groups of agen-
cies, such as those with more costly or contentious rules?  How do these 
patterns shift under different political configurations, when different parties 
are in power, or under periods of divided or unified government?  Other 
potentially fruitful research avenues include further attention to the Presi-
dent’s game-theoretic responses; the ways in which historical evolutions in 
executive orders may reflect the self-insulation dynamic; and the similari-
ties or differences between an agency’s expectations regarding presidential 
review, on the one hand, and judicial review, on the other.   
It is worth concluding by briefly reflecting upon a potential reason that 
agency behavior under presidential review has not received sustained at-
tention until now.  One explanation may be the tendency of courts and 
scholars to frame narrowly the question of insulation as one of agency in-
stitutional design.437  They identify a host of institutional “design features” 
such as personnel hiring requirements and location outside the cabinet hi-
erarchy as potential indicia of insulation from presidential influence.438  To 
shield agencies is to structure them the right way. 
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By contrast, this Article has argued that while agency institutional de-
sign choices can indeed help determine the degree of presidential control, 
executive branch agencies too can engage in autonomous and selective 
self-insulation from such influence even within these bounds.  The ques-
tion of insulation, that is, can be both exogenous and endogenous: a func-
tion of rules as well as the resulting realities.  Agencies possess self-help 
tools, in a sense, through which to insulate their decisions.  Future accounts 
of agency independence and insulation would be remiss to ignore them. 
